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Abstract
In high speed rail systems automation is used as a means to compensate for the sensory, perceptual and
cognitive limitations of the human operator. At the design level two approaches can be implemented for the operation
of such vehicles that span the whole range of automation in use:
a. Fully manual operation of the train with decision aiding, such as preview and advisory displays, assisting in
human decision. In such an approach the locomotive engineer actually controls the vehicle.
b. Fully automated operation of the train. In this approach the automated system drives the train and the human
operator's role is shifted to that of the supervisor that monitors the proper functioning of the automation.
While the latter approach seems promising there are major safety concerns related to the so-called 'out-of-the-
loop' problem, namely the human operator's inability to promptly intervene and act correctly in case of an
unexpected event as a result of vigilance decrement, loss of situation awareness and over-reliance on automation.
Consequently one of the focal points of the current research was to determine the appropriate use of
automation in high speed rail systems. For the purposes of the current research the Volpe High Speed Train Simulator
was used. It exhibits three control modes: fully manual, cruise, and fully automated control. These three levels of
automation were compared with regard to their effects on vigilance decrement and situation awareness of the human
operator. Vigilance decrement was determined by measuring responses of the human operator in a set of emergency
scenarios. Since each emergency scenario represented a different type of detection-response paradigm conclusions
were drawn about system design. Situation awareness measurements were conducted using the "freezing the
simulation" technique (Endsley, 1994).
The fully automated mode (autopilot) was found to have the best detection rate and least vigilance decrement
over time compared with the rest of the control modes. It also had generally superior situation awareness except for
speed awareness in which cruise and manual control outperformed the autopilot. Additionally while the autopilot was
associated with less workload as far as system monitoring was concerned, it imposed greater stress when reacting to
an obstruction.
High speeds reduce the allowable time of the vehicle operator to respond to an emergency, thus increasing the
risk probability of the system. A probabilistic theory -known as Markov Renewal Theory- was utilized for the
purpose of quantifying and tracing the time path of those probabilities. Exposition of this theory constitutes a separate
contribution of the thesis.
Thesis Supervisor: Thomas B. Sheridan
Title:. Professor of Engineering and Applied Psychology and
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Acknowledgments
Upon the completion of this research I would like to acknowledge the contribution of many people
who have been part of my endeavors before coming and during my stay at MIT.
First and foremost I feel the need to extend my gratitude to Professor Tom Sheridan, who has been
my advisor, mentor and friend, for his guidance and support he offered me throughout the course of this
research. He shared with enthusiasm many of my ideas, and encouraged me to purse them further always
making critical remarks. His extensive knowledge on human machine systems, has been an invaluable
source of intellectual wealth which has been instrumental in the development and completion of this work.
My association with the Human Machine Systems Lab has provided me with the opportunity to meet
many bright people. I had the pleasure working along with Steven Villareal and Jacob Einhorn on the train
simulator and really enjoyed the cooperation with both of them. Special thanks go to Dr. Edward
Lanzilotta for providing his knowledge regarding software engineering issues and experimental procedures
whenever I requested it. I would also like to acknowledge the support from the other group members as
well: Jianjuen Hu for his companionship during the summer of 1996, Shinsuk Park who participated in my
experiments, Mark Ottensmeyer, Nicholas Patrick, Suyeong Kim, Dave Schloerb, Shih-Ken Chen, Jie Ren,
Steven Landry, Joe Conti, Shumei Yin Askey and Bernardo Aumond. Special thanks go to Michalis
Kilaras. Our common interests helped forge a strong friendship.
This work was completed at the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center who was the
sponsor of the project. The opportunity to work in this facility lead to many productive relationships. I
would like thank Dr. Jordan Multer for sharing his extensive knowledge on experimental design and
providing insightful comments with regard to the present research, John K. Pollard for fixing the broken
joystick in 'no time' when I had to run experiments and finally Dr. Donald Sussman for his support and
interest in the project.
I owe a great deal of respect to my undergraduate advisor Professor Kyriakos Papailiou for the
constant support and encouragement to purse graduate studies specifically at MIT. Thanks go as well to
many friends that I made back in Greece.
Last but not least I want to acknowledge the love I have been given from my family, my father
Ioannis, my mother Paraskevi and my sister Aggeliki - Eleni, during the course of my life. I wouldn't have
made it all the way here, shouldn't have been there to support me in every aspect of my life. To those this
work is dedicated.
Xtov flatspa go'u Ioavvll
TrIv MrTs-pa goi 1hapaCics-rn
Kai aTriv xasXh?, jio'u AyyFuct"-EhEvil
Contents
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
1.2 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2: BACKGROUND ON VIGILANCE AND SITUATION AWARENESS
2.1 Vigilance
2.1.1 Introduction to Detection Theory
2.1.2 Literature Review on Vigilance Studies
2.2 Situation Awareness
Chapter 3: MARKOV RENEWAL THEORY
3.1 Markov Renewal Processes
3.2 The Markov Renewal Function
3.3 Markov Renewal Equations 22
3.4 Semi-Markov Processes 23
3.5 Semi-Regenerative Processes and Stopping Times 24
3.6 Semi-Markov Processes with an Absorbing State 26
3.7 A Simple Application of Markov Renewal Theory 27
Chapter 4: EXPERIMENTS 29
4.1 Experiment Design 29
4.2 Facilities - Interactive High Speed Train Simulator 31
4.2.1 General System Description 31
4.2.2 Simulator Upgrades 33
4.3 Experiment Description 35
4.3.1 Subject's Task 35
4.3.2 Emergency Scenarios 36
4.3.3 Experiment Control 38
4.3.4 Performance Incentives 38
4.4 Training Procedures 39
4.4.1 Instruction Material 39
4.4.2 Training Sessions 39
4.5 Subjects 42
Chapter 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 43
5.1 Human Behavior Results and Discussion 43
5.2 Risk Probability Results 54
5.2.1 Model Presentation 54
5.2.2 Model Application 56
5.3 Conclusions 61
Bibliography 62
Appendix A: Training Tutorial 64
Appendix B: Review Quiz 82
Appendix C: Subject Consent Form 86
Appendix D: Experiment Design 87
Appendix E: Subject Emergency Scenarios and Data 89
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
Rail operation has played a central role in mass transportation incorporating advantages associated
with operational efficiency, energy consumption and environmental cost. The aforementioned advantages
become more salient in high speed trains like the ones that exist in the European countries and Japan.
Examples include the Intercity Express (ICE) in Germany, the Train a Grand Vitesse (TGV) in France, and
the Shinkansen - known as the "bullet train"- in Japan which are capable of achieving speeds at the range
of 250 to 320 km/h. And the trend is towards even greater speeds: Experiments conducted with
magnetically levitated trains (maglev), such as the German TR-07, have proven the technological
feasibility of achieving speeds up to 500 km/h [3]. Of major concern though are the safety implications that
arise from speed increase and are related to human physical and/or perceptual limitations as illustrated
below:
1. The greater the speed the more difficult is for the human operator to see the wayside signals and
act in time. A study conducted in France has shown that the maximum speed for accurate driver
perception is 220 km/h [2].
2. The higher the speed the lesser the amount of time that is available for reaction by the locomotive
engineer in a case of an emergency, due to the increased distance required for the vehicle to slow
down or even come to a complete stop.
Contemporary technology offers one potential solution called automation. Automation has been
introduced in many domains such the aviation industry, nuclear power plants and modern manufacturing
systems - just to name a few - as a means of rendering their operation safer and more efficient, and the
general consensus is that it has succeeded to a great extent. Unfortunately one cannot transfer the
successful application of automation from one domain to another as each one is characterized by its own
particular attributes. One such attribute is the fact that rail vehicles are constrained to move on fixed tracks
and the view from the vehicle is often quite limited relative to the distance traveled. As a result the vehicle
cannot change course should an emergency arise in stark contrast to an air or car vehicle. Another one is
related to the boredom and fatigue that train driving conveys to the locomotive engineers. Trains cover
large distances mostly through isolated areas and the locomotive engineer has to sustain prolonged periods
of rail operation without human interaction and remain vigil and alert while "nothing happens". As a result
the operator gets bored and becomes less attentive over the course of vehicle operation. There are several
reports referring to locomotive engineers falling asleep while in duty and studies regarding effects of
sleeping patterns on their performance [22]. Consequently one needs to be very careful as to the degree and
level of automation that is most appropriate for application in rail vehicles and take into account potential
side effects of the human-machine interface relative to the attributes of train driving like the ones outlined
above.
At the design level two approaches can be implemented for the efficient operation of such vehicles
that span the whole range of automation in use:
a. Fully manual operation of the train with various aids - such as preview and advisory aids [2] -
assisting in human decision. In such an approach the locomotive engineer actually controls the
vehicle and makes decisions regarding vehicle operation.
b. Fully automated operation of the train. In this approach - referred to as automation in control -
all necessary information for the operation of the vehicle is passed to the automated system which
is responsible for operating the train according to prescribed rules. The human operator's role is
shifted to that of a supervisor which monitors the proper functioning of the automated system.
The level of automation used in the current operational high-speed rail systems (ICE, TGV,
Shinkansen) is a blend of the two extreme approaches cited above. According to a study related to safety in
high speed trains "the German philosophy (ICE) of rail development emphasizes automated control with
use of the human as a system monitor, while the French (TGV) and Japanese (Shinkansen) depend more on
the human for control decisions" [3]. A feature common to all of the above mentioned rail systems is the
fact that the high speed train occupies a single track itself and no other rail vehicle can use it. Here in the
U.S. the design plans for the introduction of high speed trains foresee that tracks should be shared by both
high and low speed trains (passenger or freight) for the efficient utilization of the existing network of
tracks. Hence even though fully automated rail operation is within the capabilities of current technology,
the human operator is still necessary to be physically present at the cab in case the automation fails, to
handle an unexpected event such an obstruction, a bad track condition, a discrepancy between an incab and
a wayside signal, or even to reduce public anxiety. Questions regarding his capacity to take over control in
case of an emergency are yet to be clarified and are often related to the philosophy behind the automation
in use. Human operator inability to successfully and promptly intervene in case of an unexpected event
deteriorates as a result of vigilance decrement, loss of situation awareness and manual skill and reliance on
automation. Furthermore there exists a substantial body of evidence in the literature regarding vigilance,
which suggests that "monitoring a system for potential failures is a role for which humans are poorly
suited" [12].
Consequently one of the focal points of the current research has been to determine the appropriate
use of automation in high speed rail systems with regard to attributes specific to train driving such as
boredom and fatigue. For the purposes of the current research the Volpe High Speed Train Simulator was
used to simulate a high speed train driving environment in which "nothing happens for long time".
Towards this end the number of emergencies was kept to an extremely low level. The simulator exhibits
three control modes for the operation of the train, namely manual, cruise, and fully automated control.
Under manual control the human is solely responsible for controlling the speed of train, while in cruise
control the human operator sets the desired speed (according to the signals or the civil speed limits) and the
automation is responsible for achieving and maintaining it. Operation of the vehicle under fully automated
control requires no human intervention as the automation is programed to recognize signals and civil speed
limits and adhere to the lesser of the two. These three levels of automation were compared with regard to
the vigilance decrement and situation awareness of the human operator. Vigilance decrement was
determined with respect to responses by the human operator in a set of emergency scenarios. Since each
emergency scenario represented a different type of detection-response paradigm conclusions where drawn
related to system design. Situation awareness measurements were conducted using the "freezing the
simulation" technique [14], [15].
The other major goal of this research was related to safety analysis. Both deterministic and
stochastic models have been employed toward this end, the latter ones being the most promising for
modeling human-machine systems due to the variability and unpredictability in the perception, decision
and action that humans exhibit. As stated above, high speeds reduce the allowable time for the vehicle
operator to respond to an emergency within certain time constraints, thus increasing the failure probability
of the integrated human-machine system. The current research aimed at providing the theoritical
foundations needed to model stochastic systems in such a way that the evolution over time of these "failure
probabilities" can be quantified. Towards this end a probabilistic theory, known as Markov Renewal
Theory, was utilized for the purpose of quantifying and tracing the time path of those probabilities. A
simple model was then developed to capture these "failure probabilities" in the "high" versus the "low"
speed regimes of train driving.
1.2 Thesis Overview
The goal of the thesis was to examine the effects of automation on human attention and fatigue in
high speed trains and provide the means for modeling and quantifying the risk probability in the "high"
versus the "low" speed regime. Chapter 2 gives the necessary background on Vigilance and Situation
Awareness. Detection theory as applied to model human observers is presented along with a literature
review on vigilance studies. The measurement of situation awareness is presented in the context of two
recent articles. Chapter 3 introduces the reader to a powerful tool drawn from the field of Applied
Probability: Markov Renewal Theory and the concept of semi-regeneration of stochastic processes are
presented. These concepts are then taken further and developed to form the results used by the thesis.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the Volpe High Speed Train Simulator, addresses software engineering
issues and gives a detailed description of the experiment. Chapter 5 summarizes and comments on the
results of this work.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND ON
VIGILANCE AND SITUATION AWARENESS
2.1 Vigilance
Vigilance refers to the capacity of the human operator to sustain attention and remain alert to stimuli
over prolonged periods of time. Vigilance studies have their origin in World War II when the Royal Air
Force (RAF) commissioned Norman H. Mackworth to study the radar observers' decrement in detection
rate of enemy submarines, which occured after only about 30 minutes. His studies marked the beginning of
research aimed at discovering factors that might be related to what is known as the vigilance decrement.
2.1.1 Introduction to Detection Theory
Vigilance studies have been conducted mainly in the context of yes-no experiments: the observer is
presented a set of stimuli some of which contain a "signal" to be distinguished from a "noisy" background
and the observer responds "yes" to each particular stimulus that contains the signal and "no" to the ones
that contain just the noise and not the signal. Correctly recognized stimuli that contain the signal, are
termed hits, whereas mistakenly recognized ones false alarms. If the observer failed to recognize a signal
stimulus and responded "no", then he is credited with a miss, while when he correctly didn't recognize any
signal he has made a correct rejection. One can summarize the input stimuli and the responses using a
table as the one presented below:
Stimulus class
Signal
Noise
Response
'"yes"
Hits
False Alarms
"no"
Misses
Correct rejections
Table 2.1: Summary of Stimuli and Responses
The hit and false alarm rates can be written as probabilities of "yes" responses conditional on the
possible stimuli:
Hit: H = P ("yes" I Signal)
False Alarm: F = P ("yes" I Noise)
Misses and correct rejection probabilities are (1- hit rate) and (1-false alarm rate) respectively.
One way to characterize the vigilance decrement is the decline in the percentage of correctly
detected signals over time, and this decline is often regarded as resulting from a deterioration in the
observer's perceptual sensitivity. However the success in correctly detecting a signal might not always be a
function of perceptual ability. Observers' reports might depend on nonperceptual factors related to the
anticipated gains or losses with regard to correct or incorrect responses. Such factors affect their
willingness to respond "yes" rather than "no" and hence the vigilance decrement may or may not be
attributed to decline in perceptual sensitivity.
For such reasons the Theory of Signal Detection [5], [6], [7], [8] has been adopted and used in
vigilance research. The most commonly used measure to characterize the perceptual sensitivity of the
observer is defined in terms of the inverse of the normal distribution function (figure 2-1):
d' = z(H) - z(F)
which converts the hit and false alarm rates to a z-score that is in standard deviation units. A proportion of
0.5 is converted into a z-score of 0, larger proportions into positive z-scores and smaller ones to negative
z-scores. Index d' is an invariant measure of sensitivity and takes non-negative values with 0 representing
inability to differentiate between critical and non-critical signals. Perfect accuracy, on the other hand,
implies infinite d'. To avoid infinite values it is common to convert proportions of 0 and 1 to 1/(2N) and
1-1/(2N) where N is the total number of stimuli that were presented to the subject [8].
I I
0.4
Noise
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.C
Figure 2-1: Underlying distributions of Signal and Noise
2.1.2 Literature Review on Vigilance Studies
Since the original work of N. Mackworth a variety of experiments have been conducted to study
vigilance behavior and the vigilance decrement has been replicated consistently. The dominant
characterization on vigilance performance has been the R. Parasuraman and D. R. Davies taxonomy of
vigilance [9] according to which individual differences in vigilance performance are not so much task
specific as task-type specific. Hence it was suggested that classification of the vigilance literature can lead
to an improved specification of the types of tasks in which reliable decrements in efficiency occur in terms
of a few dimensions of the viginalce task taxonomy.
In a later article [10] Parasuraman identified two such dimensions: the type of discrimination
(successive versus simultaneous) and the event rate. Successive discrimination tasks are the ones that
require the observer to distinguish a signal from a non-signal reference when these are presented
successively, as opposed to simultaneous discrimination tasks in which signal and non-signal features are
presented simultaneously within the same stimulus event. The successive discrimination tasks impose
greater memory load since the observer has to distinguish a target from a non-target presented in recent
memory. From his study he concluded that the vigilance decrement results from a decrement in perceptual
sensitivity only if (i) target discrimination loads memory and (ii) the event rate is high. Otherwise the
decrement reflects shifts in the response criterion over time. Another dimension on the vigilance task
taxonomy that he added later was related to the level of signal discriminability. According to his studies for
highly or moderately discriminable signals perceptual sensitivity declined for the successive
discrimination tasks but not for simultaneous tasks when the event rate was high. For low discriminability
signals perceptual sensitivity declined in both types of tasks.
While vigilance has been studied extensively in the context of laboratory tasks, relatively few studies
have been performed in environments that closely simulate actual work settings, the main reason being the
difficulty of applying signal detection theory. And from those the majority focuses on the aviation industry.
Another feature that questions the extent to which data from laboratory tasks can be extrapolated to
operational tasks is the event rate used. To the overwhelming majority of vigilance studies a target rate of 1
target per minute is considered low in sharp contrast with reality in which "events" that need to be
distinguished and act upon, such as failures, are much more rare. Very few studies have been preformed
with a very low target rate of the order of 1 target per 30 minutes [12], [13]. This is where one of the focal
points was for the purposes of the current research: to measure vigilance decrement in an environment that
replicates to a great extent an operational system using a very low target rate.
2.2 Situation Awareness
According to Endsley, Situation Awareness (SA) can be defined as a person's "perception of the
elements of the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and
the projection of their status in the near future". At the lower level of SA the person perceives the
information from the operational system, extracts the necessary data and integrates them in a meaningful
way at the second level, and at the third and higher level, based on the understanding he has, future events
and states of the system can be predicted and hence decisions can be made.
The enhancement of situation awareness is a major goal for the human factors engineer, that must be
taken into account during the development phase of operational systems. As a construct it is extremely
useful since it provides an objective test-bed on which the engineer can evaluate different design concepts
ranging from automation and displays to attention and performance.
Many methodologies for the empirical measurement of situation awareness have been proposed. The
most promising one is the "freeze technique" whereby the simulation is frozen at random times and
subjects are queried about their perception of the system at that time [14], [15]. With this technique the
system displays are blanked and the simulation is suspended while the subjects answer questions related to
the system. In this way data can be collected immediately, which reduces the problems incurred when
collecting data after the task is over. Recent studies on situation awareness conducted by Endsley [15]
using this technique provided evidence that it is not intrusive on normal subject behavior during the trials
and doesn't suffer from limitations of human memory.
CHAPTER 3
MARKOV RENEWAL THEORY
This chapter introduces the main ideas of Markov Renewal Theory. Though the exposition draws
heavily from [20] and [21] the notation used is somewhat different. The emphasis has been in the
presentation of the theory rather than the mathematical rigor as the later can be found in the references
cited above.
3.1 Markov Renewal Processes
Let N be the set of non-negative integers and R. the set of non-negative real numbers. Define X,
and T. as random variables on a probability space (Q, 9t, P) such that for each n e N, X, takes values in
some fixed countable space E called the state space:
X,: Q -- E T,: Q2 -- R.
and 0 = To 5 T1 5 T2 < .... The sequence of pairs (X., TJ) is said to form a Markov Renewal Process
with state space E if:
Pr[Xn.l= j, T+I-T, < tJXo, X1, ... , X,= i, To, TI,...Tn]= Pr[X,.,+I= j, T,.+I-T, n tlX,= i] (3-1)
Note that Xn is the state of the process at the nth transition and Tn is the time that the nth transition
occured. What the above equation states is just a generalization of the ordinary Markov Processes: Namely
not only the state but also the time for the next transition are random variables. Throughout the discussion
we will assume (without any loss of generality) that the process starts at To= 0 and that the probabilities in
(3-1) do not depend on n which implies that the process has stationary transition probabilities (the process
is homogeneous). The probabilities:
Qi(t)= Pr[X.+ 1= j, Tn+ I-T, - tIlX= i] (3-2)
are the one step transition functions of the process. The matrix Q(t) for which Qij(t) is the i,j element is
called the Semi-Markov kernel of the process (X,, T) . For each pair (i, j) the function t -- Qi(t) is non-
decreasing right continuous, bounded and it is assumed that Qj(O) = 0. By taking the limit as time goes
to infinity one can obtain:
lim Qi(t)= Qe(o)= Pr[X.+= jlX,= i]= PU
I -- on
That is, the Pi, are the one-step transition probabilities for some Markov chain with state space E. Hence
the sequence X, forms a Markov chain. On the other hand we can consider the state space E of consisting
of a single point. In this case the times at which the process transitions (T,),,N form a renewal process.
Equation (3-2) can be written as:
Qij(t)= Pr[Xn+1= j, Tn+ 1-T < tlX= i] = P(i,j) .Pr[T+ 1-Tn I tlXn+l= j,X,=• i] = Pii Fi(t)
where Fj(t)= Pr[T+ 1-T, 5 tiXn+1= j, Xn= i] or Fj(t)= Qgj(t)/Pgj, i, j E E, t E R+ (3-3)
Equations (3-3) give the temporal distribution at which the process transitions given the current state of the
process and the next state that will visit. From them one can compute the probability distribution function
for the time that the process will spend in state i regardless of the next state that will be visited:
F,(t)= Pr[Tn+,-Tn5tlXn= i]= YQ(t)= Pr[T,,n-Tn-t,X .+= jiXn= i] (3-4)
jeE jEE
It should be noted that the random variables T. + I-Ta, n e N which are the times between two successive
transitions of the process are not independent (since they depend on the next state to be visited) but are
independent conditionally on the path of the Markov chain Xn. That is, if one prescribes the states the
process Xn , n E N has visited then the increments T.+ 1-T,, n e N will be independent.
3.2 The Markov Renewal Function
Throughout this section (X,, T,), N will be a homogeneous Markov renewal process with a semi-
Markov kernel Q over a finite space E starting at To= 0. Then (X,),, E is a Markov chain on E with one
step transition probabilities Qij(oo)= P, underlying the Markov renewal process as mentioned above. We
now introduce the two step transition functions for the Markov renewal process as:
Q (2)ij(t)= Pr[X.+2= j, Tn+ 2-Tn<tlXn= i] = Pr[X2= j, T 2 <tlXo= i] (3-5)
where the last equality holds due to the homogeneity property. Using the standard renewal arguments we
condition on the time of the first renewal:
Q(2)j(t) = Pr[X2= j, T2 tjXo= i, T, 5 t]. Pr(T, < t) +Pr[X2= j, T2 tXo= i, T > t] Pr(T, > t)
and noting that Pr[X2= j, T2 < tjXo= i, T, > t] = 0 the equation above can be written further as:
t
Q(2)i(t) = Pr[X2= j, T < t, T, 5 tlXo= il = JPr[X2= j, T2 t, XI= k, T= dsIXo= i] -
km E 0
ke E 0
The probability Pr[X 2= j, T2- T1 5 t- s, XI= k, TI= dsIXo= i] can be written as:
Pr[X2= j, T2 - T1 5 t- sJX,= k, TI= ds, Xo= i]i Pr[Xl= k, TI= dsJXo= i] and using the definition of
Markov renewal processes equation (3-6) takes the form: Q('2)(t) = C fdQik(s) Qkj(t - S) (3-7) where
keE 0
the derivative is taken with respect to the time variable of the one step transition functions Qq(t) .
By induction one can show in that in general: Q(")ij(t) = Y JdQik(s) (n - 1)kj(t - s) (3-8)
ke E 0
which are the n-step transition functions of the process. Equations (3-8) can be put in matrix form as
follows:
t
Q(")(t) = JdQ(s).Q(n-1)(t-s)= (Q Q(n- ))(t)
0
where the again the matrix derivative is take with respect to the time variable of the kernel Q(t).
Defining the indicator function: A(X) = otherwif X e A0 otherwise
1 (X,1 ) =
11 (T 1) i=0 o
1f0, t](T ) 0=
f X,,= j
therwise
which takes the value I whenever the process visits state j and zero otherwise
if T,, [0, t] which likewise takes the value I whenever the nth transition of process
otherwise
occurs before t and zero otherwise.
It's worthy to note that the above two defined random variables are not independent and their product
will be I only when the event { X-,= j, T < t }n,, ~ occurs, namely only when the nth transition is in statej
and it occurs before time t. The sum:
I li(X) - 110,tl(Tn)
n=0
is a random variable its self and gives the number of transitions that the process has made in j in the
interval [O,t]. The expectation of the above random variable is found by applying the expectation operator
Ei( • ) which denotes the conditional expectation E[ - IX0= i] with respect to the initial state i:
Rij(t) = EiI o 1(Xn) - 1[0ot(T,)]
By exchanging the summation with the expectation operation and noting that the expectation of the
indicator function is just the probability that the event has occured the equation above can be written as:
R(t) = Q y'(t) V i, j E E (3-9)
n=O
where R,(t) is the expected number of visits to state j in the time interval [O,t] for the process that started
at To= 0 in state i. For every i, j in the state space E we can define R(t) to be the matrix whose i, j element
is Rij(t):
R(t) = Q1")(t) (3-10)
n=0O
we can define two random variables as follows:
This matrix is called the Markov renewal function and plays a very important role in the theory of semi-
Markovian processes as we will see later on. In fact the main result of this thesis is that if state j is a
trapping state for the Markov renewal process then the renewal function in (3-9) gives the probabilities
that the associated semi-Markovian processes starting from each state i has moved in the trapping j state
earlier than time t and so one by proper identification of states can trace the time path of those
probabilities. For now we will write equation (3-10) as:
R(t) = I + Q(t) + Q(2)(t) + ... and observing that (Q®R)(t) = Q(t) + Q2 (t) + ... ( is the
convolution operator as defined above) we can write (3-10) as R(t) = I+ (Q 0 R)(t) (3-11) or
equivalently in component form we get a set of integral equations as follows:
1 +Eke E dQ ik(s)Rkj(t-s) i = j
Ri(t) = o (3-12)
XkeE fdQik(s) Rkj(t-s), i j
0
By using the Laplace transform of the time derivatives of the single step transition functions:
Q j(s) = ee dQij(t)
0
and taking the Laplace transforms in equation (3-11) or (3-12) we obtain a closed form solution in the
frequency domain:
R(s) = l(s)(!-Q'(s)) - ' (3-13)
where the I(s) is the Laplace transform of the identity matrix and I is the usual identity matrix. If the state
space E is finite then the Rij(t) satisfying (3-11) or (3-12) are unique. However if the state space is infinite
then a solution satisfying (3-11) or (3-12) might not be unique.
3.3 Markov Renewal Equations
The equations we will introduce form a system of integral equations which are often encountered in
the study of renewal processes. We shall present the solution to such equations as this will be utilized later
on in the study of semi-Markovian processes.
Let's consider a homogeneous Markov renewal process (X,, T,), N with a finite state space E and
semi-Markov kernel Q(t), and let R(t) be the corresponding Markov renewal kernel. The class of
functions we will be working with, to be denoted by B are the functions:
f: Ex R+ - R
continuous or right continuous and monotone in the second variable (well behaved probability functions).
A functionf e B is said to satisfy the Markov renewal equation if for some function g E B:
fi(t) = gi(t) + keE J rdQik(s) fk(t-S) i,kE E, t E R+ (3-14)
0
The equations above has a unique solution which is given by:
t
fi(t) = ,keE ,dRk(s) " gk(t- s), i,k E, t R+ (3-15)
0
Proof of the existence and uniqueness of the above solutions in the case of finite state space E are provided
in the references [20] and [21] among others.
3.4 Semi-Markov Processes
Let's consider again a homogeneous Markov renewal process (X,, Tn) , . N with a finite state space
E and semi-Markov kernel Q(t). We can define a continuous-time parameter process Y = (Y,),,• on E
such that:
Y, = X, if T << t< Tn+, (3-16)
The stochastic process defined by (3-16) is called a semi-Markov process associated with
(Xn, T,),6 N.. The times 0 = To < T, < T2 5 ... are the successive times the process Y, transitions and
Xo, XI, X2,... are the successive states visited. The word semi-Markov comes from the somewhat limited
Markov property that Y, enjoys, namely the present and the past of the process are independent given the
present state only at the times Tn the process transitions. If the times between transitions are exponentially
distributed and depend only on the current state and not to the next one visited, then the semi-Markov
process becomes a temporally homogeneous Markov process.
In such a case the Markov transition functions are of the form: Qij(t)= PI( 1 - e •"i) . This means that at
any time instant on the real line the Markov process is regenerated continuously in accordance with the
memoryless property of the exponential distributions. In other words every time instant the future and the
past of the process are independent. In contrast the same is true for semi-Markov processes only at
discrete time instants in the real line. These discrete time instants are the times Tn at which the process
transitions. To put is in other words in the case of a Markov process one can shift the time origin of the
process at any point in the real line whereas in a semi-Markovian process the time origin can be shifted
only at the time instants Tn at which the process transitions. The transition probabilities of a semi-Markov
processes can be studied by the usual renewal arguments as done in [20] and [21]. However to give more
insight on such processes we will derive the same result using the notion of semi-regeneration. But first we
introduce the idea of semi-regeneration.
3.5 Semi-Regenerative Processes and Stopping Times
A random variable T: 92 -- R. is called a stopping time for the process Y, if the event {T < t }
can be determined from the history of the process Yt up to time t. To give a feel of what stopping times are
we present some examples:
- Consider a Markov chain. The time at which the process visits a fixed state for the first time is a
stopping time for the process because one can observe the process and be able to tell whether the
process has visited the fixed state by time t.
- Consider a Markov chain that has some transient states. The random variable defined as "time at
which the process visits a fixed state for the last time" is not a stopping time since one is not able to
tell whether the process has visited the fixed state for the last time just by looking at the history of
the process up to time t. He needs to observe the whole history of the process in order to able to tell
which time the process exited the fixed state for ever. But this contradicts the definition a stopping
time.
The stochastic process Y = (Y,),,• R. is said to be semi-regenerative if there exists a Markov renewal
process (X n, T,),, • with finite state space E imbedded in Y such that:
a) for each n e N, Tn is a stopping time for Y
b) for each n E N, Xn is determined by { Y, :s < T.}
c) for each n e N, m 1, 0 = to 5 tl 5 t2 5 ... and any bounded function fin R'":
Ei[f( YrT, +, YT.,+t2 
.
'. YT,+,,) Ys :s  Tn] = EI[f(Yt,, Ytz ... , Yt.)] given that {X,= j}
The semi-Markovian process introduced earlier can be defined in an alternative way [20] to be semi-
regenerative and using this fact we will obtain the sample paths for the transition probabilities. Using the
usual renewal argument we condition on the time of the first renewal T, :
Pij(t) = Pr[Y,= jlXo= i, T 1, t].Pr(T, < t)+Pr[Y,= jjXo= i, T, > t] -Pr(T1 > t) (3-17)
The second term in the above equation can be written as:
Pr[Y,= jjXo= i, T,>t] = I(i, j)(1- I Qjk(t)) (3-18)
keE
while to compute the first term we shall use the notion of semi-regeneration. Since the process Y is semi-
regenerative it satisfies the above conditions. We apply condition c) by choosing for functionf the indicator
function which is bounded in R: f(Y,) = lj(Y,)
Statement c) above for any time t 2 T, after the first transition becomes:
Pr[Y,= jlXo= i, T= s]= Ei[lj(Y,) jY.:s< TI] = Ek[ll(Y,_)I 1 = Pr[Y,_•= jjXo= k, T1= s] (3-19)
Plugging (3-17) and (3-18) into equation (3-16) we obtain:
P,() = I(i, j)(1- X Qjk(t) + JdQ(s)Pj(t- s) V i, k E, t R+
ke E ke EO
But the above equation is just the Markov renewal equation (3-14) satisfied by the transition probabilities.
The solution to this equation was given in (3-15) and thus we have:
Pi(t)= fdRij(s) - I(i, j)(i - Qjk(t)) (3-20)
0 ke E
3.6 Semi-Markov Processes with an Absorbing State
An absorbing or trapping state in a stochastic process is a state which once the process has entered it
never leaves. Hence transitions to another state are impossible. Transition from a state to itself is possible;
however this happens after an infinite time. For any such state, call itj equations (3-3) take the form:
Fj(t)= 0 for all finite times t > 0 and Fij(.)= 1. Consequently the one step transition functions from
equation (3-3) are zero for all finite times t > 0 and hence the Markov renewal kernel will have zeroes in
the line corresponding to the trapping state:
X X X ... X
Q(t) = 0 0 0... 0 • J j -line (3-21)
X X X ... X
X X X ... X
Looking at equation (3-20) the sum I Qjk(t) will equal to zero when j is a trapping state and the
k E
integral in (3-20) yields just the R,(t) that were introduced in equations (3-10) and (3-12)
One point to remark is that in the case of a semi-Markov process with transient and absorbing states
the above analysis can still be used. In such a case the Rij(t) will yield the average number of times that
the process starting from the transient state i has visited state j by time t, for every transient state j e E
in the state space of the process, and will yield the probability that the process starting from the transient
state i has been trapped in statej by time t, for every trapping state j e E . So in essence once the process
has visited the absorbing state it ends.
In the next section we give a simple example so as to make the ideas presented thus far more tangible
and demonstrate their validity in modeling simple stochastic processes.
3.7 A Simple Application of Markov Renewal Theory
Let's consider the simplest stochastic process which models the lifetime of a machine component,
such as light bulb. The process begins at the transient state (the machine component functions, the light
bulb is on) and after some random period of time it fails. Assume for simplicity that the lifetime of such a
component follows an exponential distribution with rate b and let's ask what is the probability that the light
bulb has failed by time t and what is the average number of times that the bulb will be on?
Since the lifetime of the bulb follows an exponential distribution with rate b the probability that it
has failed by time t is just 1 - e-bi and the average number of times that the bulb will be on in any time
interval [O,t] is just I since after it fails it is assumed not to function again (it is "thrown away").
The above stochastic process can be modeled as a semi-Markov process with two states only: One
transient (the bulb functions) that we will call state 0 and one absorbing or trapping state (the bulb has
stopped functioning) that we will call state 1:
0 1
For this simple process matrices P and Q(t) are: P = I Qt= IFo (t  whereLO 1 0t Fol(t)
Fol(t) = 1 - e-b , F1 1(t) = 0, V t E [0, oo) and F11(oo) = 1 . We take the matrix derivative of Q(t):
Q'(t) = be-b and then its Laplace transform which is: Q'(a) = 0 +a and we apply equation
(3-13) to obtain the Rj(a) in the frequency domain:
Ra) a) Qa 1 0 b
R(a) = I(a)(I- Q'(a)) R(a) =- +a - R(a) -. +a
a a
Taking the inverse Laplace transform we obtain:
8(t) = [u(t) 1 - e-b
U0 u(t)
where u(t) is the step function at the origin.
Note that 0 is not a trapping state so Roo(t) gives the average number of times that the process will
visit state 0 by time t which of course is always equal to 1. However state I is a trapping state so the last
column of the above matrix gives the probabilities that process by time t has stopped when starting from
either the transient state 0 or the trapping state I which of course agrees with the results presented earlier.
Alternatively one could have obtained the same results directly by using equations (3-12).
CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Experiment Design
The experiment described here is focused on exploring human factors issues that have been deemed
to be a critical component of safe rail operation. Rail vehicles cover large distances mostly through isolated
areas and as a result train operators find it difficult to remain vigil, alert or even awake over prolonged
periods of time. The attenuation in their attention has been attributed to boredom and fatigue as after of
several hours of vehicle operation "nothing has happened". Several reports on accidents within the rail
transportation community have identified engineer's inattention stemming from boredom and fatigue, as
the main cause of signal violations and accidents. And the picture is projected to worsen as train speed
increases since the available latency time for perception, intervention and actuation is reduced.
Automation offers one potential solution for improving the performance of the integrated human-
machine system. However one needs to investigate the effects of control automation on the train operator's
attention. Automation's side-effects such as the so-called "out of the loop problem" and the consequent
over-reliance on automation might contribute to an operator's fatigue instead of reducing it. Humans tend
to rely on automation and the concern is that a "bored" locomotive engineer might become even less
attentive when the functionality of the vehicle is assumed by the automated system.
Given the above it was decided in the earlier stages of this research to concentrate on the underload
case of the train operator by simulating a high speed train driving environment in which "nothing happens"
for a "long period of time" hence inducing boredom to the human operator. Toward this end the number of
emergency scenarios was kept to a minimum as discussed later on. The next step was to use this
environment as a test-bed for exploring how different levels of automation affect human performance in
terms of the vigilance decrement over time and situation awareness. Further issues such as the risk
probability at high speeds were explored.
Vigilance decrement over time was evaluated using signal detection theory, which requires instances
of signals to be presented over a noisy background to the observer who has to distinguish them.
Accordingly emergency scenarios which represented failures of the system were introduced. The failures
remained active only for a certain period of time and then, unless they had been noticed and reset by the
subjects, they were automatically reset. The amount of time to complete a round trip (45 minutes) was
broken into 3 time blocks and the vigilance decrement was evaluated in each one of them. When
conducting experiments in a simulated environment that replicates an actual setting it is difficult to
estimate the percentage of false alarms. Hence the percentage of failures reset by the subjects (detection
rate) in each time block was used as a proxy for the vigilance decrement [12].
Situation awareness was decided to be conducted using the query technique for the reasons outlined
in Chapter 2. The queries chosen to be asked were related to the overall state of the rail system ranging
from speed and position to display indications. Provision was taken to familiarize the subjects with
simulation suspensions during the training sessions of the experiment.
Emergencies were presented within the cab (instrument panel failures) and out the window
(obstructions) to ensure that subjects' attention wouldn't be biased towards monitoring a particular display.
Finally a bonus/penalty scheme was used to ensure consistency of operator behavior with the operational
rules of rail systems and the purposes of the experiment. This scheme is presented in the tutorial
(appendix A).
4.2 Facilities - Interactive High Speed Train Simulator
4.2.1 General System Description
The High Speed Train Simulator is a real-time interactive and distributed system that has been
developed for the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center for studies associated with human factors
research in high speed rail transportation. Below is given a brief outline of the simulator. (A detailed
description is out of the scope of this document and can be found elsewhere [1]). The system is comprised
of the two SGI personal Iris Workstations, one SGI Indigo-2 workstation, a personal 486 computer, a
projector with a projection screen, the cab and control lever. A rough layout is presented in the figure
below:
projecti
SGI Indigo-2
Figure 4-1: Simulator layout
The SGI Indigo-II workstation (with Extreme graphics) is used to generate high resolution graphics
for the out-the-window view display and its output is fed into the projector which is used to project the
image on the projection screen. Vehicle dynamics computations are performed in the same workstation as
well. One personal Iris is responsible for displaying the instrument panel (figure A-3) while the other one
is used as the Central Traffic Control workstation. All three machines communicate with each other over a
Local Area Network (LAN).
The throttle represents an integral part of the Simulator and is used for controlling the speed of the
train. It is connected to the serial port of the Indigo-II workstation via an Analog to Digital (A/D)
converter. This lever is used to control both the thrust and braking commands, with the forward (up)
direction for thrust and the backward (down) direction for braking. The center position (coast) is notched
for reference and there neither thrust nor brakes are applied.
The simulator exhibits three control modes, namely full manual control, cruise control, and autopilot
control. Under manual control the vehicle operator is solely responsible for controlling the speed and the
position of the vehicle using the combined control lever. The cruise control system is designed to maintain
a constant speed which is set by the operator. The functionality is generally similar to the cruise control
systems found in automobiles. The autopilot system is able to fully control the speed of the vehicle without
human intervention. In such a case the human's role is shifted to that of the supervisor who monitors the
system for proper functioning. This means that the operator must be prepared to take over control should
the situation warrant.
The rail system used in the experiment is comprised of two stations, named the East and the West
station (figure A-2), separated by 50km of single track. At the ends of each station loops are used to reverse
the vehicle in the main track. The one way travel time from station to station depends on the signals set and
is approximately 19 minutes if no signals are set while the travel time around the loops takes a bit more
than 4 minutes. Hence the round trip lasts roughly 43 minutes. To this time one must add the time the
vehicle remains in the station which was about 30 seconds.
Rail systems have traditionally used a system known as block signaling for the control of trains in
the rail system. With block signaling, the track is divided into chunks known as blocks. While the length of
each block is fixed (does not change over time), different blocks are not necessarily of equal length.
Typically, shorter block lengths are used near the vicinity of stations, while longer block lengths are used
in regions away from the stations. Block lengths are generally of the order of one mile. In the road system
used in the simulation, all blocks between stations are 2 km, and all blocks in the loop sections are 1 km in
length. At the boundaries of each block there is a signal light. This signal light displays a color-coded
signal (details can be found in the tutorial), which indicates the maximum speed permitted throughout the
block. The signal acts as a dynamic speed limit, and it is the responsibility of the vehicle operator to
identify the signal as the block boundary is approached and set the vehicle speed accordingly. A
fundamental rule in block signaling is that no more than one train can occupy a block at any given time.
A red signal is used to indicate that the block is currently occupied by another train, and the approaching
train is not permitted to enter that block. The blocks that precede the occupied block have signal levels
which ensure that the train can be slowed in time to stop before entering the occupied block.
In addition to the speed limits imposed by the block signal system, there are also civil speed limits,
which are static. These are dictated in urban areas due to the increased likelihood of having accidents. In
the simulation the blocks that have civil speed limits have grade crossings as well. In all cases, the
prevailing speed limit is the lesser of the block signal limit and the civil speed limit. The exact specification
of signals used and speed limits associated with those signals is a design parameter for a rail system, and
varies from system to system. In the simulation system, a five-aspect signaling system is used. This means
that there are five color codes used in the system, with the codes defined as shown in table A. 1.
4.2.2 Simulator Upgrades
For the purposes of the present research several upgrades of the train simulator had to be performed.
These included:
1. The addition of suspend/resume capabilities in the train simulator for the purpose of gathering
situation awareness data. Any time the experimenter - acting as the CTC operator - can suspend the
simulation and ask questions relevant to the state of the vehicle. There have been designed and
implemented two versions: in one, which is the default and used in the experiments, the out of the window
view is blanked and the dashboard is blanked except for the communications window which still remains
active so that the subject can respond. In the other version both screens are just frozen but not blanked. One
can invoke the later version by using the -noblank flag in the command line argument when running the
train simulation. In any case provision has been taken for the simulator to record everything pertaining to
the state of the train as well as the subject's response. Additional provision has been taken to reset the
simulation clock for purposes discussed below.
2. Options for the experimenter to activate/disactivate the ATP (Automatic Train Protection) system
from the CTC screen. This option can be invoked using the -atp flag when running the CTC simulation.
The network programming for both of the above options was done using the BSD socket interface
and the communications protocol used was the UDP (User Datagram Protocol) which is the protocol used
originally to build the simulator and is layered above the Internet Protocol (IP). For the particular
application the UDP protocol though connectionless has advantages over the connection oriented TCP,
since in case of a network failure the data packet sent from one machine to another is guaranteed to be
delivered when using the TCP protocol. This means that the packet will be retransmitted until it reaches its
destination, which might result in a delay of several seconds. As a result the data received and displayed by
the destination machine will not correspond to the real time data. In contrast the UDP has no mechanism of
checking whether the data sent are lost, making it ideal for a real time simulation system: by keeping the
rate at which data are sent to the destination machine high a lost data packet will not even be perceived by
the simulation since another one - with the accurate simulation data - will be sent shortly.
3. Development of a new version for the autopilot. In the previous version of the simulator the
autopilot once invoked would control the speed of the train adhering only to civil speed limits. Hence in the
case that a signal was present the autopilot would fail to recognize it and the vehicle operator needed to
assume manual control to adjust the vehicle speed. In the current version - under which the present
research was carried out - the autopilot would recognize civil and signal speed limits simultaneously and
adhere to the lesser of the two, thus replicating existing train autopilots such the one used in the German
ICE. Hence under normal conditions the operator need not interfere with speed control of the train but only
monitor that the autopilot adheres to the speed limits of each block. This version of the autopilot can be
realized using the -full_auto flag in the command line argument when running the train simulation.
4. The addition of bearing failure. In this scenario the temperature of a faulty bearing rises as a result
of increased friction in its rollers. The rate at which the temperature goes up under failure conditions is
higher than it is under normal conditions.
5. The addition of failure reset mode for the purpose of gathering vigilance data. In older versions of
the simulator once the failures are set they remain active until the subject notices them. In the current
version one can have the failures reset according to the time that has elapsed or the distance that the train
has traveled since the onset of the failure, in the event that the subject has not been able to spot and reset
them in time. To use this mode one must specify the -fail_reset option in the command line argument
of the main simulation and in the failure input file has to enter the keywords time followed by the time in
milliseconds one wants the failure to remain active, or distance followed by the distance in meters that
the vehicle will travel before the failure is reset. Needless to add that the previous mode (whereby the
failures are set and remain active until reset form the subject) remains yet an additional option.
As stated above, provision has been taken to reset the simulation clock. Hence in case one has
suspended the simulation while a failure is active, the failure will remain active for the residual amount of
time when the simulation is resumed.
4.3 Experiment Description
4.3.1 Subject's Task
The subjects were required to operate the High Speed Train Simulator according to the operational
rules and operating requirements of such a system as outlined in the training tutorial (appendix A) that they
were given to review. Since speed and position control of the vehicle are the most important aspects of
train driving the task was to control the vehicle speed according to the signal and civil speed limits present
in each block, monitor the system for potential hazards posed by failures and respond to them in a proper
manner should they be present.
To explore the effects of different levels of automation the experiment consisted of driving the
simulated train from West Station to East Station (figure A-2) and back (one shift) using one particular
control mode. For each subject there were a total of three runs, lasting about 45 minutes each and
completed using a different control mode namely manual, cruise control, and autopilot (or fully automatic
control). Between successive runs periods of rest longer than 10 minutes were mandatory so that the
subjects could refresh themselves before proceeding in the next trial. Under manual control mode the
subjects used the lever to control the vehicle speed by applying thrust or braking. When driving the train
under cruise control mode the subjects were responsible for setting the desired speed according to the
speed limits of each block and let the system apply the proper amount of thrust to achieve and maintain the
set speed. Cruise control would not apply brakes, so the subjects had to apply the brakes should the
situation warrant this as dictated by either emergencies (obstructions, failures) or the presence of either
signal or civil speed limits. Under autopilot mode speed control of the vehicle was exclusively assumed by
the automated system which was responsible for setting the speed in accordance to the speed limits of each
block. In this case the subject's task was to monitor the proper functioning of the automation.
4.3.2 Emergency Scenarios
For the purposes of assessing performance the following failure scenarios were introduced, each
used for a different purpose:
1. Motor failure. Under normal operating conditions when thrust was applied (either manually by
using the control lever or by the system) the ammeters, which show the amount of current that goes
through each motor, would be lit on the instrument panel (figure A-3). A motor failure resulted in an
absence of current flow through one of the motors which was indicated on the motor ammeters. In this case
the correct response was to a) first remove power from all the motors by pulling the control lever back to
braking position b) press the appropriate key for resetting the failure and c) resume operation of the vehicle
using the previous control mode. The failure remained active for 12 seconds and unless reset by the subject
was automatically reset after that amount of time.
2. Bearing failure. The bearing temperature would normally follow the speed of the train with some
time lag and never rise above 55 OC for safety reasons. So in essence the bearing temperature fluctuated
around a mean value, depending on the average speed of the vehicle during the course of the trip, with a
maximum rate of 1.53 mHz. In a failed bearing the temperature rose with a rate almost double the
maximum rate regardless of the vehicle speed. The subjects had to notice this change in the rate and press
a key to reset it. The failure remained active for 20 secs before it would reset automatically.
The failures presented above were used to assess the vigilance decrement. In essence normal train
driving conditions provided the "noisy background" and the above two types of failures were the "signals"
to be detected by the "observer" (train operator). The time that the failures remained active was chosen to
represent the average reaction time of the population and was inferred by experiments [1] conducted with
the same type of failures. Bonus was given for spotting and resetting the failures whereas penalties were
applied for hitting the reset keys when there was no failure present. The scheme is presented in the tutorial
in appendix A.
3. Brake failure. The brake pressure gauges indicated the pressure of the compressed air in the brake
tanks. Their indication ranged from 98 psi when no brakes were applied to 22 psi when full service brakes
were applied and would fall further to 0 psi under emergency braking. When a failure was present one of
the brake tanks would loose pressure. The pressure loss was indicated in the corresponding brake tank
gauge. Once the failure was detected the correct response was to switch to an alternate compressor by
depressing the appropriate key on the computer keyboard. This failure differentiates from the previous
ones in that a certain distance of 800 meters was given to the subject to reset the failure. Now the reaction
time depends on the speed of the train. Data gathered from this type of failure were used by the Markov
renewal theory to provide the time paths of the risk probability in the high versus the low speed regime.
The above distance was again chosen as the average distance traveled before a brake failure was reset as
indicated by experiments conducted with the same type of failures.
Additional perils to the safe operation of the system were posed by obstruction hazards. These were
present at points where highway roads and rail tracks intersect. In total, there were five grade crossings. At
each grade crossing, highway vehicles (cars) could cross in front of the train from either direction. These
vehicles were visible at over a half kilometer distance. As stated each of the blocks containing grade
crossings, had a civil speed limit of 100 km/hr. This means that the maximum speed of a vehicle in the
block was 100 km/hr unless a lower speed limit was imposed by a signal in that block. Traffic at the grade
crossings arrived according to a probabilistic process. A car would proceed across the crossing only if
there was sufficient distance to clear the crossing before the train. (In other words, a car would not proceed
if there was not enough "room"). However, it was possible for a car to become disabled as it was crossing
the tracks, which would result in an obstruction for the train. In this event, the train operator should bring
the train to a complete stop before the intersection. If the train was not stopped in time, a collision would
occur, which would be indicated by a cracked windscreen. It was important for the train operator to be able
to quickly assess the crossing traffic and determine whether the train should be stopped. On one hand, a
collision was a major event, and would result in a significant delay in operation. On the other hand,
stopping the train unnecessarily would also cause delays in service. It was up to the vehicle operator to
evaluate the situation and determine the best course of action under these constraints.
This type of emergency was used to assess the effects of control automation when the operator had to
react under stress and to estimate the feel of control the subjects had over the vehicle.
4.3.3 Experiment Control
In the course of the experiments for the purpose of comparing the results and experimental control
the failures were set to occur at fixed positions along the track according to the distance that the vehicle
had traveled. However from the perspective of the subjects the failures were set randomly. The average
number of failures (motor, bearing) for the whole round trip was only two, since our interest was to
simulate a train driving environment that induced boredom and fatigue, and this number was given to the
subjects during the training sessions. Additionally, the motor and bearing failures where spread across the
different levels of automation and time blocks evenly (counterbalancing principle). Thus, for instance,
each time block would have on average 5 motor failures and 4 bearing failures or the other way around,
depending on the control mode and time block. Detailed positions of where the failures were set to occur
are given in appendix D while the emergencies each subject experienced along with the subject's
performance are given in appendix E. The counterbalancing design of Table 4.1 was used both in the
training sessions and actual trials using the "shift" principle. According to this, subject 1 would be
introduced to the control modes according to line 1 of that table but would experience them according to
line 2, subject 2 would be introduced to the control modes according to line 2 of that table but would
experience them according to line 3 and so on for the rest of the subjects.
4.3.4 Performance Incentives
To ensure that the operator performed according to the objectives of the experiments a bonus system
was used which provided monetary rewards for good performance. However penalties where also assessed
if operator's performance didn't fall within certain criteria. The precise specification of the bonus/penalty
used in the experiment can be found in the Training Tutorial in appendix A. Bonus or penalty points where
converted to monetary rewards at a rate of $1 per 1000 points and the subjects were paid after the
experiment.
4.4 Training Procedures
4.4.1 Instruction Material
Due to the complexity of the system and to familiarize the subjects with rail operation a written
tutorial was prepared. Its backbone as far as rail operation and system description is concerned was the
original version developed by Dr. Edward Lanzilotta modified accordingly to highlight and address issues
pertinent to the current research. It included the general operational rules that govern rail operation,
operating requirements and control modes of the train simulator, and it provided details on the experiment.
The use of the tutorial served many purposes: It provided with an adequate background all of the
candidates and gave them ample time to assimilate the material. Hence they had the opportunity to get a
feel of what the purpose of the experiment was and could have any questions answered before they had
hands on exposure to the system. On the other hand it acted as a filter to gauge interest of the participants
in the experiment since it required a substantial commitment of time to read and comprehend. In this sense
review of the training tutorial was the first step of their participation is the experiment. The training tutorial
is included in appendix A.
4.4.2 Training Sessions
Once the subjects had read the training tutorial they had to take a written quiz. This was given to
ensure that all of them had read the tutorial before coming in the training sessions and to identify potential
problems on the understanding of the material that needed to be clarified during the training sessions that
followed. The quiz consisted of 17 multiple choice questions, required approximately 10 minutes to
complete, and was graded upon completion. There was a minimum performance requirement of 50% on
the quiz to continue on the next phase which was the training session. The quiz is included in appendix B.
The training session lasted three hours and gave hands on exposure to the system. During the first
hour the experimenter demonstrated the proper vehicle operation and introduced the subjects to the
emergency scenarios so that they would get familiar with them and learn the proper response to such
situations. The remaining two hours were devoted to preliminary rides both with and without the
emergency scenarios that would further familiarize them with the system and its operating modes. During
this period the subjects completed a run from station to station using one particular control mode. To
counterbalance possible learning effects across subjects each subject was introduced to the control modes
according to the counterbalancing design presented in Table 4.1. During these runs the experimenter was
physically present in the cab monitoring the way the subjects controlled the vehicle and making
recommendations related to the proper actions under each control mode. Performance was monitored and
suggestions regarding speed compliance were given. These runs lasted about one hour and a half. During
the final half hour of the training session another run from station to station was given in which the subjects
had the freedom to experiment with the simulator in any way they liked and ask questions that they might
have. During this run the experimenter shared his time between the cab and the CTC room to allow more
freedom on vehicle operation by the subjects. Additionally the simulation was suspended three to four
times during the last hour of training to familiarize the subjects with the freezing technique and queries
related to the system were asked.
After the training session was over the experimenter would give a short break to the subjects and ask
for their opinion regarding the level of control they felt they had over the system. At this point the subject
could pick to have additional run(s) that would either expose them to more emergency scenarios or would
replicate an actual trial with a very few failures and so on. Never did the experimenter proceed in the actual
trial unless he had the "green light" from the subjects.
Subject Number Presentation order of control modes
Autopilot
I Manual
Cruise
Autopilot
2 Cruise
Manual
Manual
3 Cruise
Autopilot
Manual
4 Autopilot
Cruise
Cruise
5 Autopilot
Manual
Cruise
6 Manual
Autopilot
Table 4.1: Counterbalancing design of the mode presentation ordering
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4.5 Subjects
A total of 15 subjects participated in the experiment. No specific criteria were used to filter out the
subjects. A consent form was required to be signed prior to their participation in the experiment and is
included in appendix C. The majority (12) where undergraduate or graduate students at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Two students where used in the initial phase for fine tuning the experiment while
the remaining 13 ran in the actual trials. The data from one subject (non-MIT) had to be thrown since upon
inspection data showed that he had repeatedly failed to comply with speed limits. No particular problems
were noticed in the behavior of the remaining 12 the subjects.
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5,1 Human Behavior Results and Discussion
For the vigilance study, time -particularly time block- was the independent variable and the
vigilance decrement was the dependent variable with parameter being the level of automation. Detailed
presentation on the performance of each subject is given in appendix E. The results from the three practice
blocks across the different levels of automation are summarized in tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Figure 5-1
shows the percentage of correctly detected signals in each time block for each different control mode.
Evidence of vigilance decrement is present for all three modes. However the detection performance
under autopilot mode was consistently higher than for the rest of the control modes in all three time blocks.
Additionally the detection rate showed less decline over time as evidenced from figure 5-1. From the two
remaining control modes, namely the manual control and cruise control, vigilance performance was worst
for the cruise control mode but relatively stable over time in contrast with the manual control mode. The
latter had a high detection rate in the initial stages of the task (first time block) but declined as time
elapsed. The vigilance results regarding human efficiency of automation monitoring are in accordance with
the ones found in the literature [12]: When humans have to monitor the automation and report 'failures' (as
was the case in the experiment) performance is equally good under either manual or automatic control. The
problems with automation arise when humans are involved in multiple tasks. Such were the cases under
cruise and manual control in which the subjects had to continuously control the speed of the vehicle in
addition to system monitoring. And as a result vigilance performance declined over time. Below we will
see how interesting the vigilance results are in regard to situation awareness and subject comments.
It is worth mentioning that despite the different discrimination category for the two signals (the motor
failures required simultaneous discrimination as opposed to the bearing failures which required successive
discrimination) subjects detected equally well both signals in all time blocks. This is attributed to the very
low event rate which didn't impose memory load on the subjects and on the extensive and thorough
training the subjects went through before the trials [10] as evidenced by their subjective ratings in figure
5-6.
During the trials the simulation was suspended at random times, and the subjects were asked to
report their speed, the block number and kilometer post where they were, the brake pressure, the bearing
temperature and the current through the motors. Results from the brake pressure reports were not
significant since the brake pressure was fairly stable over time. To analyze the rest of the data the following
procedure was used. For the speed and bearing temperature responses, the mean of the absolute error
(MAE) was computed. The subject response was subtracted from the actual value and the absolute value of
the result was taken. The average was taken across all subjects: MAE = x -• where x was the
ni=1
subject response, X^ the actual value and n the number of subjects. For the motor current the block number
and the kilometer post the answer was classified either as correct or wrong since a) the deviation from the
actual value was of the order of one or two and b) the response could be given with the required accuracy.
The independent variable was the system state and the dependent variable either the MAE or the
percentage of correctly answered questions, depending on the query category. Parameter was the level of
automation in use. The results gathered using the "freeze technique" for assessing situation awareness for
the different control modes are presented in figures 5-2. Boxplots are used for the speed and bearing
temperature results and display the mean, the standard deviation and the range of the data, whereas for the
motor current and the position data the percentage of correct responses is given.
Additionally during each trial the subject was presented with one obstruction. This type of
emergency was used to assess the impact of control automation when the operator had to react under stress
and to estimate the feel of control the subjects had over the vehicle. The independent variable used here
was the control mode and the dependent variable the number of collisions and the distance stopped before
the obstruction if the collision was avoided. The distance that the vehicle stopped before the obstruction is
shown in figure 5-3.
After the experiment was concluded the subjects were asked the following questions:
1. Which control mode (manual, cruise, autopilot) imposed less workload on you during the each
trial, in the sense of having ample time to process information regarding the system (such as speed, block
number and kilometer post where you were, brake pressure, bearing temperature, etc.)?
2. Which control mode (manual, cruise, autopilot) imposed greater stress when you were about to
react to an emergency such as an obstruction?
3. Which control mode did you prefer?
4. Comment on level of your training using a scale from 1 to 5 with 1: worse and 5: best. You may
use one decimal digit.
Responses to the first and second questions are presented in figure 5-4, while the response to the
third and fourth questions are presented in figures 5-5, 5-6 respectively.
The results of the situation awareness study are quite interesting. The autopilot mode presented the
higher level of situation awareness for most categories but not for vehicle speed, which is the most
important parameter in train driving. In fact autopilot had the worst performance in this category. To
explain how this occured I'll quote exactly from what one subject said when asked to respond to question I
above: "Auto pilot imposed the least workload since I could keep an eye on what was happening, yet I
didn't have to worry (as much) about watching the speed - i.e. I had to check to make sure that autopilot
was following the speed limits, but I didn't actually have to adjust the speed myself, so I could spend my
time systematically checking all the information". Very similar were the comments of the majority of the
subjects. The other interesting result is that the cruise control mode had the best speed awareness (lower
MAE) from the rest two modes. Under this control mode subjects had to set the speed using the keyboard
keys or the control lever for braking. However this hybrid control mode of the train wasn't preferred by any
subject as indicated in figure 5-5. They complained that they didn't have a good feel of speed control when
setting the speed and accordingly they had to pay more attention (compared to the rest of the control
modes) to the speedometer to make sure that the automation was achieving the set speed. This is probably
the reason that the detection rate was low from the beginning of the trials (figure 5-1) but had the best level
of situation awareness of speed (figure 5-2A).
As far as the rest of the categories are concerned, autopilot had overall higher level of situation
awareness. For the bearing temperature that might seem a contradiction according to figure 5-2B. However
there is only one data point (the one in the upper range) that increases the variance of the MAE. If that point
is considered 'noisy' and thrown away then the autopilot mode has both lower mean and variance
compared to cruise control and of course the manual control mode. Manual control had generally worse
situation awareness (but best speed awareness from the autopilot) according to the data. However it is
interesting to see that this was the control mode that gave greater level of control and confidence over the
vehicle. At a first glance this statement seems contradictory since one can see that this control mode had
higher MAE in the speed category than cruise control. However if one looks at figure 5-3, one can see the
reasoning of the argument. Under manual control the subjects had to regulate the speed using only the
combined control lever. The angular position gave the subjects a cue as to the level of thrust or braking that
they were applying.
Figure 5-3 shows the distance from the obstruction that the vehicle was bought to a complete stop
under different control modes. It doesn't include data from five subjects, two who collided, one using
cruise control and the other using autopilot, two that didn't get an obstruction and one who avoided
collision without using emergency brakes. The results indicate that all subjects responded properly. Once
they had spotted the obstruction they applied full service brakes and then they used their judgement as to
whether and when to apply emergency brakes. No subject applied emergency brakes immediately once the
obstruction was spotted. However every subject (except for the one mentioned above) under every control
mode resort to the use the emergency brakes to avoid collision, and hence the results are comparable.
Response time data to obstructions were collected. The analysis showed no significant difference in the
variance of the response time data in accordance to [1]. As can be seen the average distance that the vehicle
was stopped prior to the obstruction was greater under manual control, with cruise control and autopilot
following. However the difference between the cruise control and autopilot modes was not statistically
significant in contrast with the differences to the manual control modes which are statistically significant at
the 3% level.
It is important to see how the results presented above correlate with how subjects responded to
questions 1 and 2. The results are shown in graphs 5-4. The conclusion drawn is that while the autopilot
mode was the most convenient to use no subject felt comfortable with either cruise or autopilot control
modes when he or she was about to react to an obstruction. Again I'll use the remarks of one of the
subjects which are very illustrative and representative of what the subjects answered in question 2:
"I believe that the cruise and autopilot controls imposed the greatest amount of stress when an obstruction
was pending because after setting the speed, I would remove my hands from the control and begin to focus
on other potential problems and information that I had to know. Thus, when an obstruction occurred, I had
to jump from passively driving to actively driving and grab the controls in order to slow down".
This feel of control over the vehicle along with the 'actively driving' feel (the so-called in-the-loop-
feel) was cited as the reason for ranking the manual control mode first in their preferences by the subjects
that did so (figure 5-5) while the subjects who preferred the autopilot did so because it imposed less
workload on them. Finally, as shown in figure 5-6, training was more than adequate in the subjects'
opinion.
Time block 1 Time block 2 Time block 3
Failures 4 motor, 5 bearing 4 motor, 5 bearing 5 motor, 4 bearing
Hits 8 7 7
Misses 1(motor) 2 (motor, bearing) 2 (motor, bearing)
False Alarms 3 3 0
Detection rate (%) 89 78 78
Table 5.1: Performance under Autopilot control mode
Time block 1 Time block 2 Time block 3
Failures 6 motor, 3 bearing 5 motor, 4 bearing 5 motor, 5 bearing
Hits 6 6 6
Misses 3 (1 bearing, 2 motor) 3 (2 bearing, Imotor) 4 (2 motor, 2 bearing)
False Alarms 2 1 0
Detection rate (%) 67 67 60
Table 5.2: Performance under Cruise control mode
Time block 1 Time block 2 Time block 3
Failures 4 motor, 5 bearing 5 motor, 5 bearing 5 motor, 4 bearing
Hits 8 7 6
Misses 1 (motor) 3 (1 bearing, 2motor) 3 (1 motor, 2 bearing)
False Alarms 0 2 0
Detection rate (%) 89 70 67
Table 5.3: Performance under Manual control mode
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5.2 Risk Probability Results
5.2.1 Model Presentation
To explore the effects of high speed in the ability of the human to react before a 'deadline' a simple
model was developed. The human-machine system is considered to be in one of three possible states: State
0 is the operational state. Component failures are assumed to "arrive" according to a Poisson process. In
such an event the system moves into state 1 which represents the state of the system in which a component
failure is present and requires human compensatory reaction before the 'deadline'. If the human operator
responds properly to it, then the system moves back to the operational state 0. Otherwise moves to state 2
in which the system is considered inoperational and is modeled as a trapping state. The following diagram
depicts the idea behind the model:
normal 0 onent failure
Matrix P which defines the transitions probabilities of the underlying Markov chain will be:
010
001
and given the above functions for F(t) we can compute matrix Q(t) as the elementwise product:
0 Fol(t) 0Q(t) = poFo(t) 0 P2 2(t
0 0 0
Assuming that matrix Q(t) is known, we are interested in the time evolution of the probability that
the system will be failing after an onset of a component failure. Namely we are interested to track P 2,(t)
in high and the low speeds. This probability can be evaluated directly by applying equations (3-12) since
state 2 is a trapping state:
t
1 + ke E dQik(s) " Rkj(t- S), i = j
Rii(t)= o
,Ike dQik(s) Rk(t - s), i j
0
First note that R22(t) = 1 Vt 0 from the first of the equations above since Q2i(s) = 0 V i.
Hence the above equations reduce to:
t f
R12(t) = dQo(s) R 2(t - s) + fdQ 12(S) R22(- s) and
0 0
t
Ro2(t) = fdQ0o(s)-R 12(t-s)
0
Now taking the Laplace transform of the above equations we reach to a closed form solution for R12(t) in
the frequency domain:
Q'12(a)
1 - Q'o1 (a) Q'o1(a) R12 (a) (5-1)
which in essence is the P12(t) since state 2 is a trapping state. The Q'ij(a) in the above equation are the
Laplace transforms of the derivatives of the transition functions.
5.2.2 Model Application
The first step in applying the model is system calibration. The operational system was the high speed
train. To study the effects of speed in the human's ability to respond to an emergency (component failure),
a distance deadline was used. The human operator had to notice and react in less than 800 meters or the
system would be considered inoperational (system failure). In the simulation brake (component) failures
were assumed to arrive according to a Poisson probabilistic model at a rate of 1 failure per round trip (or 1
failure per 45 minutes). Hence the interarrival times had exponential distributions of the form:
Fo(t) = 1 - e-bt, where b = - min 1 = seconds- = 3.7 10- 4 was the rate of the Poisson45 2700
process.
The information required by the Q(t) were taken by system observation. The train speed range was
partitioned into to regions: The "low" speed region with velocities from 0 to 150 km/hr and the "high"
speed region from 150km /hr to 300km/hr. Eighteen failures where presented to the subjects 10 in the high
speed and 8 in the low speed region. The probabilities Pi where:
Low speed region: Po0 = 0.625 and P12 = 0.375
High speed region: Plo = 0.4 and P 12 = 0.6
while to obtain the transition functions (3-3) curve fitting was applied to the data given in the high and low
speed regions. These data points are presented in figures 5-8, 5-9 for the low speed region and 5-10, 5-11
for the high speed region.
Exponential least squares fit was found to be pretty good:
F10(t) = 1 - e-c', where c is the reset rate of the brake failure prior to the deadline and
-d(t - to)F12(t) = 1 - e , where again d is the rate at which the system fails. It is interesting to notice
that this distribution function has a time shift of to since even when the train travels with its maximum
speed of 300 km/hr and a failure is present the system will not move to the fail state prior to to = 9.6
seconds. The parameters of the exponential were found by the fit and were:
Low speed region: c = 0.089seconds- ' , d = 0.333seconds- 1 , and to = 18seconds
High speed region: c = 0.14seconds-' , d = 0.5seconds-' and to = 9.2seconds
Taking the derivatives of the above functions and plugging them into (5-1), one can obtain a closed form
solution for the time paths of the failure probabilities in the high and low speed region. The expression is:
a +(c + b)a + cb -toR 12(a) = dPl2c32.a-- (5-2)
a + (c + b + d)a2+ [cbPl2 + d(c + b)]a + dcbPl2 a
where the fact that the Laplace transform of R22(t) = 1 is L 1 } = 1.
a
The solution for the time paths of the probabilities was obtained taking the inverse Laplace transform. The
results are presented in figures 5-12. Before commenting on the results we should note that a stochastic
system with transient states and a trapping state will eventually be trapped as time tends to infinity. This
can be quickly seen from equation (5-2) by applying the final value theorem in the frequency domain. This
is evident in figure 5-13.
Figure 5-12 and 5-13 present interesting information regarding the failure probabilistic structure of
the system given the assumptions stated above. Figure 5-12 presents the failure probability immediately
after the onset of a failure; we shall call this the transient behavior. This is dominated by the failure
probabilities P 12 . One can infer that by doubling the operational speed of the train the probability of
failing to react to a failure before a deadline, immediately after its onset, goes up about 50%. However the
long run behavior is dominated by the rates c and d of the distribution functions. According to figure 5-13
the system operating under high speeds will fail in the best case, in half the time than it would otherwise
under the low speed regime. Additionally by using this curves one can predict the mean time to failure.
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5.3 Conclusions
The results that were just presented indicate that the type of control automation definitely affects
human performance in many aspects. A good example is the cruise control mode used in this research,
where because of the element of uncertainty with regard to speed control, subjects were more attentive to
the speedometer than the other instruments, and had very good performance at the expense of proper
monitoring of the rest of the 'system' as the vigilance data indicated. Additionally the cruise control mode
imposed greater workload on the subjects and hence no one preferred it. Generally this hybrid control
mode was disliked by all subjects.
Manual control on the other hand gave confidence in train control. Situation awareness of speed,
though worse than cruise control, was better than autopilot. This seems a bit of a paradox, since manual
control had a lower detection rate, as far as vigilance was concerned, and worse performance than autopilot
in the rest of the situation awareness categories. This can be attributed to the feel of control over the vehicle
the subjects felt they had. When the simulation was suspended the subjects answered mainly based on the
feel of the speed they had and rather than the indication of the speedometer. This is similar to car driving:
Very rarely do we attend to the speedometer, yet we "know" what our speed is.
Full automatic control, on the other hand, imposed the least workload on the subjects, in the sense
that they had ample time to monitor the system. However two potential disadvantages must be mentioned.
First is the diminished feel of control over the vehicle speed, a perceived loss of manual skill which was
evident when an obstruction was pending. Second is the fact that overreliance on automation makes
humans less attentive, luring them in higher level of complacency over the course of time.
From the human behavior experiment data were obtained for a safety analysis in high speed trains. A
simple model based on Markov renewal theory was developed and demonstrated to show how one can
trace the time changes of the failure probabilities of a stochastic system. As a suggestion for further
research one can relax the assumptions of the model by using the actual distribution functions instead of
the assumed exponentials, and by using the actual 'rate' at which incidents arrive can model and more
accurately predict failures in an actual rail system.
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Appendix A
Training Tutorial
1. OUTLINE
The current document describes an experiment that aims at addressing vigilance, situation awareness
issues and their relationship to automation in high speed rail systems as well as to model risk probability in
the "high" versus the "low" speed regime. To explore these effects the High-Speed Rail Simulator located
in the Laboratory for Human Factors Research in Transportation at the Volpe Center will be used.
This document is conceptually divided into two parts. The first part is a tutorial on how to operate the
simulator. It draws heavily from Dr.Lanzilotta's (Ph.D. ME 1995) system description tutorial as he the one
that built the Simulator it differentiates however substantially from it at parts that are important to the
present research and features that where added to the simulator by the author. It provides a general
description on how rail systems operate and then goes on to present details regarding vehicle operation,
speed and position control,automation modes and so on. The second part addresses operator performance
requirements and summarizes the bonus-penalty system in regard to the present experimental study.
Participation in the experiment consists of following phases: First review this document before
coming to the Volpe Center. The experimenter will give you a short 10 min multiple choice written quiz
once you've read it. This is intended to gauge your understanding of the system thus enabling the
experimenter to spot deficiencies that need to be covered in the training session that follows. Note that
there is a minimum performance requirement of 50% on the quiz to continue on the next phase which is the
training session. This is a three hour session that gives hands on exposure to the system. The first hour you
will be acquainted with vehicle operation and introduced to emergency scenarios allowing you to learn the
proper response to such situations. The remaining two hours are devoted to tentative rides both with and
without the emergency scenarios that will further familiarize you with the system and its operating modes.
Unsatisfactory performance in this 2 hour session -non compliance with speed limits, ignorance of the
dead man alerter e.t.c - will result in your dismissal from the rest of the experiment.In such a case you will
be eligible for payment for the training phase only. The final phase consists of the experimental trials
which will last overall 3 hours approximately and take place the same day. You will be eligible for payment
for the training phase upon completion the practice and test session unless disqualified earlier in the
training session.In such a case you will be eligible for payment only for the training phase completed. The
payment rate is $10 per hour. There additional opportunities for gain or loss depending on your
performance with regard to the experiment.
2. RAIL SYSTEMS OPERATION-BLOCK SIGNALING
Rail systems have traditionally used a system known as block signaling for the control of trains in
the rail system. With block signaling, the track is divided into fixed length chunks known as blocks. While
the length of each block does not change, different blocks are not necessarily of equal length. Typically,
shorter block lengths are used in the near vicinity of stations, while longer block lengths are used in
regions away from the stations. Block lengths are generally of the order of one mile. In the road system
used in the simulation, all blocks between stations are 2 km, and all blocks in the loop sections are 1 km in
length.
At the boundaries of each block there is a signal light. This signal light displays a color-coded
signal, which indicates the maximum speed permitted throughout the block. The signal acts as a dynamic
speed limit, and it is the responsibility of the vehicle operator to identify the signal as the block boundary is
approached and set the vehicle speed accordingly. A fundamental rule in block signaling is that no more
than one train can occupy a block at any given time. A red signal is used to indicate that the block is
currently occupied by another train, and the approaching train is not permitted to enter that block. The
blocks that precede the occupied block have signal levels which ensure that the train can be slowed in time
to stop before entering the occupied block.
In addition to the speed limits imposed by the block signal system, there are also civil speed limits,
which are static. These limits are either memorized or written down by the operator. In all cases, the
prevailing speed limit is the lesser of the block signal limit and the civil speed limit. The exact specification
of signals used and speed limits associated with those signals is a design parameter for a rail system, and
varies from system to system. In the simulation system, a five-aspect signaling system is used. This means
that there are five color codes used in the system, with the codes defined as shown in table A. 1.
If a train was occupying block 157, then the signal at the entrance to block 157 would show STOP
(red), the signal at the entrance to block 156 would show RESTRICTED (red/yellow), the signal at the
entrance to block 155 would show APPROACH (yellow), the signal at the entrance to block 154 would
show APPROACH MEDIUM (green/yellow), and the signals at blocks prior to 154 would show CLEAR
(green). The speed limits apply to the entire block, which means an approaching train must reduce speed to
the limit before reaching the entrance of the block. So, in this example, another train approaching the train
in block 157 must be going slower than 230 km/her before entering block 154, slower than 150 km/hr
before entering block 155, and slower than 80 km/hr before entering block 156 (figure A-1).
Table A. 1: Rail Signal Codes
COLOR CODE ACTION
Red STOP Not permitted to enter the block
Red/Yellow RESTRICTED maximum speed of 80 km/hr in this block
Yellow APPROACH maximum speed of 150 km/hr in this block
Green/Yellow APPROACH MEDIUM maximum speed of 230 km/hr in this block
Green CLEAR maximum speed of 300 km/hr in this block
APPROACH
MEDIUM
(green/yellow)
y
153
APPROACH
(yellow)
y
154
RESTRICTED
(yellow/red)
y
155 156
direction of travel
Figure A-i: Block Signaling System
Located throughout the system are position markers known as kilometer posts. The use of these by
vehicle operators is discussed in detail in the next section. It is important to note the difference between
block signals and kilometer posts. At the entrance to each block, there is a signal board which identifies the
block number and displays the current signal level for that block. Because block boundaries occur at 2 km
intervals on the main line in this system, there is also typically a kilometer post at the block boundaries. So,
for example, block 13 comprises the distance of track between kilometer posts 26 and 28. This provides
opportunity for confusion: The entrance to block 13 is marked by kilometerpost 26 in one direction of
travel, but when traveling in the opposite direction, the entrance to the same block occurs at kmpost 28.
Operators must take care to differentiate between block identifiers and kilometer posts, as the relationship
between them is not as simple as it might at first appear.
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3. CENTRAL TRAFFIC CONTROL
The main element in a rail system operation is the Central Traffic Control (CTC) located at a fixed
position in the system. CTC operators -known as the dispatchers- have the task of monitoring and
coordinating the operation of several vehicles that must share resources (such as the track system). To carry
out this task, the CTC operators have control over the switches in the system (thus determining which train
has priority of using a certain portion of the track in the event of a conflict) and can set signal levels
manually thus regulating the speed of the trains. Given this perspective, the CTC operators represent the
utmost level of authority which is higher than the wayside signals, the operating rules, and any other
influence. Any conflict or anomaly regarding vehicle operation spotted by the locomotive engineers should
be reported to the CTC which in turn is responsible for giving instructions on how to proceed.
The rail system used in the simulation is a fictitious rail system connecting two stations, named West
Station and East Station (figure A-2). The two stations are connected via a single track which is 50 km in
length. At each end of system, beyond the stations, there is a loop of track which is used to turn the
vehicles around for the return trip. The system is operated as a high-speed shuttle between these two
stations. Although the CTC simulation element is capable of handling multiple vehicles in this experiment
there will be only one vehicle in operation. That vehicle will travel from one station to the other, discharge
passengers, loop around to reverse direction, board new passengers, and proceed to the other station. This
procedure is followed throughout the duration of the shift.
East Station
West Station
Figure A-2: Track Layout, Simulated Rail System
4. VEHICLE OPEIATION
Instrument panel layout
The instrument panel contains gauges that display information regarding the state of the vehicle. A
schematic representation of the instrument panel is shown in figure A-3 below. The largest gauge ill the
middle is the speedometer used for controlling the vehicle speed. Secondary gauges display the brake tank
pressure, the bearing temperature, and the trolley voltage. There are also light indicators rcgarding the
operating control mode of the train, the motors current, the Automatic Train Protection (ATI') and the
Alerter systems (discussed subsequently) the door and the emergency stop status. The signals of the
current and the next block are displayed above the speedometer. In the simulation the communication
between the CTC and the vehicle operator is done textually via the communication area of the instrument
panel by using the keyboard. While a message is being composed, it appears in the lower portion of the
communications display, and is visible to only the operator. When the return key is pressed, the message is
"sent" to all other operators on the system, including the CTC operator. The message then appears in the
top portion of the communications area and is visible to all operators in the system.
Figure A-3: Instrument panel layout
a. Speed and Position Control
The most important aspect of train driving is the control of vehicle speed. This is not an easy task as
might appear at first. Due to the large inertia of the vehicle (typically in the range of hundreds of tones) the
distances required for the acceleration and decceleration of the vehicle are very large. As a result the
operator does not get immediate feedback in regard with the outcome of his/her action. The picture
becomes gloomier as speed increases since distances required for braking increase whereas the allowable
response time to unexpected dangerous situations (such as a sudden detection of an unexpected obstacle)
decreases. A reasonable solution that is being implemented is rail systems is the utilization of civil speed
limits at risk prone areas such as urban areas and grade crossings.
In the simulation blocks 0 1 11 12 and 13 have civil speed limits due to grade crossings present is
these blocks. Grade crossings areas are the only places where car/track obstructions can occur and thus the
civil speed limit has been set to a maximum speed of 100km/h. Consequently the train's speed on a block
is governed by stepwise civil speed limits and signals. Observation of these limits is absolutely necessary
for the safe and efficient operation of all vehicles because of potential risks otherwise involved such as
collision between trains or train and vehicle in gradecrossings, derailment at switches or curves and so on.
This implies that if a train is approaching a block with a particular speed limit, its speed must be reduced to
below that speed limit before -not after- it enters the block. The operator uses the position of the vehicle to
obtain the current speed limit, through a combination of civil speed limits and block signal states (which
are observed on the wayside and provided in the instrument panel). The operator then uses the control lever
to adjust the speed of the vehicle accordingly. The vehicle operator gets information about vehicle speed
through the speedometer, which is located on the instrument panel in the locomotive cab. In the train
simulation, this speedometer is implemented as a round dial gauge. The units shown are kilometers per
hour (km/hr), and the available range of speeds is from 0 to 350 km/hr. The major increments of the gauge
display are 50 km/hr, with minor increments each 10 km/hr. The red pointer indicates the current speed,
while the smaller yellow pointer (underneath the red pointer) indicates the set speed (used by the
automation systems).Another important task of the vehicle operator is monitoring the position of the
vehicle in the rail system. This is done by monitoring the out-the-window view. Typically, at one mile
intervals (or kilometer intervals depending on the metric system used), a post is placed on the wayside with
numbers indicating the mile (kilometer) marker known as "milepost" ("kilometer post"). The simulation
provides options for using either mile or kilometer posts. In the current experiment we will be using
kilometer posts. In order for the operator to control the speed appropriately he needs to become familiar
with the braking and accelerating characteristics of the vehicle. Figure A-4 shows the full service braking
profile and Figure A-5 the emergency braking profile at ground level.
Full Service Braking Profile
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Figure A-4: Full-Service Braking Profile
Emergency Braking Profile
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Figure A-5: Emergency Braking Profile
The information provided by these curves is crucial and can be used in many different ways: The
full-service braking profile can be used to estimate appropriate braking points under manual control. For
instance assuming that the vehicle is traveling at 300 km/h Eastbound and is currently at block 7.
Remembering that block 11 has a civil speed limit the operator must apply full service brakes before
entering block 9 since as can be seen from the full service profile the braking distance from 300km/h to
100km/h is 4.5 kilometers (roughly the distance of two blocks) approximately. Similar considerations
should be taken while approaching the Stations. In another case the above profiles can be used to determine
the appropriate braking action is a case of an obstruction. Obstructions in the grade crossings are visible
from the vehicle for a distance of almost one kilometer therefore this braking performance provides
adequate opportunity for the vehicle operator to detect and react properly to an obstruction in a grade
crossing. The braking distance from 100 km/hr is around.8 kilometers using full service braking.
However in the event that the grade crossing obstruction isn't spotted in time the operator may have to use
(depending on the distance to the obstruction) emergency braking which will result in a complete stop
from 100km/h in less than 200 meters. Emergency braking has a high cost both in equipment and service
quality and should be considered the last resort as discussed in the later part of this tutorial.
b. Control Modes
The simulation has four control modes available for vehicle operation. These are:
a) manual mode, b) cruise control mode, c) programmed stop mode, and d) autopilot mode. The latter three
are considered automatic control modes because part of the vehicle control task is performed by a
computer-based control system.
In manual mode the locomotive engineer is actively involved in train driving using the combination
control lever to provide all thrust and brake commands required to achieve speed and position control of
the vehicle. He is operating the train in all aspects.
In cruise control mode, the automatic control system applies the appropriate level of thrust force to
maintain a constant speed setting. The vehicle operator can invoke the cruise control mode, by depressing
the cruise control enable switch (F5 key). When the cruise control mode is enabled, the cruise control
indicator light (green) is illuminated, and the yellow pointer on the speedometer indicates the set speed.
The vehicle operator can alter the set speed by depressing the "up-arrow" and "down-arrow" keys on the
keyboard. With the depression of each key, the set speed is adjusted up (or down) by 1 km/hr. This feature
allows the operator to "tune" the set speed. When the operator adjusts the set speed down to a lower speed,
the vehicle will coast down to the lower speed. The level of control in this mode is somehow split between
the human and the machine. By depressing the cruise control switch (F5 key) while in cruise control mode
the operator returns to manual control (toggle key).
In programmed stop mode, the automatic control system applies the appropriate level of brake force
to stop the vehicle at a specific position. We will not be using this mode in the experiments.
In the autopilot mode (or automatic control mode), the automatic control system applies the
appropriate level of thrust and brake forces to follow a predetermined speed trajectory. The vehicle
operator invokes the autopilot function by depressing the autopilot enable switch (F7 key) while the
vehicle is in motion. For best performance, the vehicle must be traveling at a speed greater than 10 km/hr
when the autopilot is activated. When the autopilot mode is enabled, the autopilot indicator light (blue) is
illuminated. In addition, the pre-determined speed setting is indicated by the yellow pointer on the
speedometer. Once vehicle control has been assumed by the automatic control system, all necessary
vehicle control commands are provided by the control system. The automatic mode is programmed to
abide to the set speed limits (civil or signal). F7 key is toggle as well and can be used form within the
autopilot mode to return to the manual control mode.The task of the operator is reduced to monitoring the
vehicle and wayside signals, looking for potential problems in operation. The engineer's role is shifted
from the operating to the supervising level.
For reasons of safety, application of the brakes will always disengage any automatic control system.
As a result, it is not possible to engage an automatic control mode when the brakes are in use. If the
operator attempts to engage an automatic control system while the brakes are applied, the system will not
respond to that mode command, and the vehicle will remain in manual mode. Obviously one can switch to
manual mode regardless of the automation mode she/he is using just by moving the control lever
backwards to its center (coast) or braking position.
c. In-Cab Signal System
This system displays the signal of the current and the next block inside the cab. Bringing the signal
indications inside the cab has several advantages: Signals cannot be obscured by bad wheather conditions
(fog, snow) and they provide a form of preview to the locomotive engineer since at high speeds (in excess
of 220 km/h) it is virtually impossible to detect a wayside signal and act appropriately in time. It is
noteworthy that in case of a discrepancy between the wayside signal and the in cab signal the locomotive
engineer is required to follow the in cab signal indication. The simulation uses such a system. Two
horizontal light indicators above the speedometer indicate the current and the next block signal.
d. Traction System
The simulation uses four traction motors as this is the number usually encountered in practice. The
engineman's principal guide to locomotive performance is the ammeter which shows the current actually
going through a traction motor. By moving the control lever the locomotive engineer governs the amount
of current through the motor windings thus the tractive force (if any) provided by the motors. At the center
position no tractive force is applied whereas moving the lever forward form the center position the tractive
force is increased proportionally to the amount the lever is moved. Moving the lever backwards from its
center position all traction power is removed from the motors and brakes are applied. The automatic modes
available to the simulation have the ability of determining automatically the amount of tractive force
required to operate the train.
The dashboard display includes four current meters (ammeters), which display the level of current
through each of the four traction motors. In manual mode, these displays will respond directly to the input
at the combination control lever, while in automatic mode, they provide a mechanism for observing the
operation of the automatic systems. The traction motors are protected by circuit breakers, which will
interrupt the flow of electrical power to the motors if a failure condition is detected. Each of the four
motors has a separate circuit breaker. Under certain circumstances one traction motor will fail. The
occurrence of this event can be observed through the ammeters---when one (or more) of the ammeters does
not respond with the others. The procedure for resetting the failed motor is as follows: remove all power
from the other traction motors, by moving the combination control lever to a coast or brake position. b)
Depress the appropriate traction motor reset switch (F1 through F4 on the control panel). c) Apply tractive
power manually, using the combination control lever. d) Resume the control mode previously in use. If any
of the traction motor reset switches are depressed while power is applied, a safety system causes all of the
traction motor circuit breakers to trip, preventing motor overload. In this event all of the circuit breakers
must be reset to resume proper operation.
e. Brake System
There exist several different systems for braking train vehicles ranging from conventional such as air
braking to the more advanced such dynamic and regenerative braking. The simulation utilizes the
conventional braking system namely air brakes. Compressors are used to compress air which is stored in
tanks within the locomotive. When the brakes are applied, pressure is released from the tanks, causing the
brakes shoes to contact the rotating surfaces resulting in a friction force which deccelerates the vehicle. All
trains -the simulation included- have two modes of braking: service and emergency braking. Under normal
operating conditions the locomotive engineer uses the control lever to deccelerate the vehicle by pulling it
backwards from its center position. Application of the maximum available braking force is known as full
service braking. However there might be circumstances in which the full service braking decceleration is
inadequate (collision avoidance). In such a case the operator uses the emergency braking by depressing the
appropriate control switch on the instrument panel, which results in the release of all of the pressure in the
brake system. This provides the maximum possible brake force. Once the emergency brakes have been
applied, the emergency brake indicator on the instrument panel becomes red and the brakes cannot be
released until the vehicle comes to a complete stop. After that the operator can disengage the emergency
brakes by pulling back the control lever to a position which results in application of the service brake and
then depressing the appropriate switch. At that point, the emergency brake indicator light will be
extinguished, and the vehicle will be ready to continue with normal operation.
As shown in the dashboard there exist two round gauges which display the pressure in the brake
tanks. In the train simulation, there are two brake tanks. The corresponding gauges are round dial gauges,
calibrated in units of pounds per square inch (psi), with a range from 0 to 100 psi. The normal reading
when the brakes are not applied (i.e., the nominal high pressure) is approximately 98 psi. When full service
braking is applied, the pressure drops to approximately 22 psi, and the pressure further drops to 0 psi under
emergency braking. If there is a failure in the braking system, one or both of the tanks may show a
reduction in tank pressure. This situation will result in the brakes being applied without being commanded
by either the operator or the control system. The procedure for rectifying this situation is to switch to an
alternate brake compressor. This is accomplished by depressing the brake compressor switch (F10 key).
The pressure in the faulty tank will then rise to the appropriate level.
f. Bearing Temperature Display
Under normal conditions the bearings temperature rises (falls) as speed increases (decreases). In a
faulty bearing the temperature will rise regardless of the vehicle speed due to increased friction and its
temperature will gradually rise to 70 OC. Even when the train comes to a complete stop the temperature
will remain high due to the wear of its metal parts. In such a condition the operator is required to depress
the Fl 1 key which will drive cooling air at the bearing thus restoring the temperature back to normal.
g. Trolley Voltage Display
The right most dial gauge on the instrument panel displays the voltage available from the power
supply grid to the traction motors of the vehicle. Under normal operating conditions that will always be
1500 V DC.
h. Alerter System
The Alerter System (some times called the "deadman" alert system) is an onboard safety system
whose purpose is to ensure that the driver is alive and functional at the controls. The principle behind the
system is the requirement for periodic input to it - by depressing a button - from the vehicle operator.In the
case that the system does not receive an input from the operator within a period of 42 seconds from the last
depression it generates a warning reminding the operator to do so. The warning consists of a flashing
yellow indicator light and an audible chime. If the operator does not respond within 10 seconds of the
onset of the warning, the system applies the emergency brakes. In this scenario, both the alerter warning
light and emergency brake light will be illuminated. The operator resets the alerter used in the simulation
by depressing the Esc key on the keyboard.
i. Automatic Train Protection (ATP) System
The ATP is another safety related system designed to prevent a train from overspeeding within a
block, thus reducing the risk of an accident. As has been stated the effective speed limit in a block is the
lesser of the speed limits dictated by the block signal and the civil speed limit (if any) present in the block.
This limit is calculated from the ATP based on the position of the train and if its speed is larger than it by
more than 15km/h emergency brakes will be applied. However if the trains speed is larger the effective
speed limit but by an amount not grater than 15km/h then a warning is issued that consists of an audible
chime and the yellow indicator light on the dashboard. The operator then has 20 secs to reduce the speed of
the vehicle at an acceptable level or emergency brakes will be applied while the corresponding dashboard
light will remain lit.
j. Door Control
The vehicle operator is responsible for controlling the state of the passenger doors. The doors are to
be opened when the vehicle is stopped in the station. In principle, the doors must not be opened at any
other point in the system, for the protection of the passengers. Door control is accomplished through the
door control button (F8 button). The state of the doors is indicated by the door indicator light (red) on the
instrument panel. When the light is illuminated, the doors are open. Depressing the door control button
while the vehicle is stopped will cause the state of the doors to change---if the doors are open, they will be
closed, and if the doors are closed, they will be opened.
A safety system prevents the doors from being opened while the vehicle is in motion. Door control
commands while the vehicle is in motion will be ignored. If the vehicle is stopped with the doors open, any
attempt to move the vehicle will cause a penalty application of the emergency brakes.
4.EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION
The experiment consists of driving the simulated train from West Station to East Station and back
(one shift) using one particular control mode. There will be a total of three runs each completed using a
different automation mode namely manual, cruise control, and autopilot modes. Note while these will be
the primary operating modes during each shift you are allowed to switch modes for brief periods only as
dictated by emergencies posing danger to the safe operation of the vehicle (obstructions, speed limit
violations). Since high speeds are desirable, bonus points are given for early arrivals as shown in figure A-6
Under average performance you should be able to complete the trip within 45 minutes in which case
no bonus/penalties apply. In any other case the scheme at figure A-6 will apply. However this does not
imply that you should neglect or try to circumvent safety systems such as the ATP. In fact penalties
regarding inappropriate application of the emergency brakes will result as shown in the following table:
Emergency Stop braking Penalties
Triggered by ATP : -2000
Triggered by Alerter: -2000
Triggered by the operator -collision avoidance -100
Triggered by the operator- No reason -300
Table A-2: Penalties resulting from application of the emergency brakes
Your self as test subject is required to operate a virtual high speed train and comply with the
operational requirements and operating rules of such a system as described in this tutorial. Speed and
signal compliance for instance are considered key performance items regarding the safe operation of the
vehicle. As stated in the beginning of this document one of the goals the current experiment is to
investigate and assess vigilance performance and situation awareness of the operator in the context of high
speed train driving. This is done by monitoring and recording each operator's (test subject) actions
throughout the test sessions, to a set of emergency scenarios which are presented below. In addition as an
incentive, there is a bonus system which provides monetary rewards for good performance. If operator
performance does not fall within certain minimum criteria, penalties may be assessed.
Emergency Scenarios
Response to abnormalities in the operation of the rail system where introduced earlier while
describing the system. However for the purposes of this research we will be using a later version of the
simulator in which failures are reset automatically according to the time that has elapsed or the distance
that the train has traveled since the onset of the failure, in the event that the subject has not been able to
spot them and reset them earlier. There will be 4 kinds of emergency scenarios used for a different purpose
each:
1. Motor failure: In this scenario the circuit braker for one motor is tripped requiring reset. The
failure results in an absence of current flow through one of the motors indicated on the motor ammeters
located in the instrument panel. In this case the correct response is to first remove power from all the
motors by pulling back to braking position the control lever then pressing the appropriate key for reset and
finally resuming control of the vehicle using the previous control mode. The failure remains active for 12
seconds and unless reset is automatically reset. Figure A-7 summarizes the bonus incentive system used
for motor failures.
2. Bearing failure: The bearing temperature fluctuates around a value depending on the speed of the
train.Under no condition should the temperature rise above 55 O C for safety reasons. If it does the reset
procedure is to press a key (F11) that will drive cooling air to the bearings thus lowering their temperature.
The failure will remain active for 20 secs before it resets automatically. The bonus incentive system is
presented at Figure A-7.
3. Brake failure: One of the brake tanks loses pressure. The pressure loss is indicated in the brake
tank gauge. Once the failure is detected the correct response is to switch to an alternate compressor by
depressing the appropriate key on the computer keyboard (F10). This failure though differentiates from
the previous 2 in that a certain distance of 800 m is given to the subject to reset the failure. Now the
reaction time depends on the speed of the train. The bonus given for noticing and resetting the failure is
800 points.
4. Obstruction Hazards: There are points in the rail system where highway roads and rail tracks
intersect. In total, there are five grade crossings, one each located in blocks 0, 1, 11, 12, and 13. At each
grade crossing, highway vehicles (cars) can cross in front of the train from either direction. These vehicles
are visible at over a half kilometer distance.In each of the blocks containing grade crossings, there is a civil
speed limit of 100 km/hr. This means that the maximum speed of a vehicle in the block is 100 km/hr unless
a lower speed limit is imposed by a signal in that block. Traffic at the grade crossings arrives according to
a probabilistic process. A car will proceed across the crossing only if there is sufficient distance to clear the
crossing before the train. (In other words, a car will not proceed if there is not enough room). However, it is
possible for a car to become disabled as it is crossing the tracks, which will result in an obstruction for the
train. In this event, the train operator must bring the train to a stop before the intersection. If the train is not
stopped in time, a collision will occur, which will be indicated by a cracked windscreen. It is important that
the train operator be able to quickly assess the crossing traffic and determine whether the train must be
stopped. On one hand, a collision is a major event, and will result in a significant delay in operation. On the
other hand, stopping the train unnecessarily will also cause delays in service. It is up to the vehicle operator
to evaluate the situation and determine the best course of action under these constraints. If a collision
occurs, the vehicle operator must stop the vehicle and immediately contact the CTC operator to report the
collision. In the case of a collision, the windscreen will appear "cracked." This crack will remain for the
remainder of the shift. Bonus/penalties are assessed according to the following table:
Obstruction outcome Bonus/Penalty
Collision avoidance: +1000
Collision Speed:>= 90km/h: -1000
Collision 70 km/h<= Speed <= 90km/h: -800
Collision 40 km/h<= Speed <= 70km/h: -600
Collision 10 km/h<= Speed <= 40km/h: -450
Collision Speed <= 10km/h: -250
Table A-3: Obstruction hazards bonus/penalty scheme
Schedule Accuracy
Time to complete the trip (min)
Figure A-5: Schedule accuracy bonus/penalty points
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Figure A-6: Emergency response time bonus points
From the graphs one can infer that a bonus of 100 points per second is given for the motor failures as
opposed to 60 bonus points per second, whereas the bonus/penalty scheme for schedule accuracy is
approximate 12 bonus points per second.
During each shift (from East station to West station and back) you will experience on average 2
emergency scenarios from either category 1, 2, or 3 and in addition to these you might get or not
obstructions. If you think that an emergency scenario is present you should respond appropriately as
described above. However if you took such an action while not necessary you will be penalized -300
points. For instance if you pressed the brake pressure reset key (F10) while there was no reason you lose
300 points. If an emergency was present and you took no action then the penalty is -300 points.
Situation Awareness
To investigate the relationship between control automation and situation awareness the temporary
freeze technique. The simulation is suspended at random locations during vehicle operation the screens are
blanked and questions relating to the overall state of the vehicle are asked such as the current block number
and position (kilometer post), train speed, speed limit of the next block etc. Each correct answer to the
questions asked gets 1000 bonus points while there is no penalty for wrong answers (guessing is
encouraged).
Appendix B
Review Quiz
Select only one answer form the ones presented below based on what is stated in the tutorial document.
1. What is the length of a block used throughout the simulation?
a. lkm
b. 2 km
c. 1 mile
d. None of the above.
2. How many trains are allowed to occupy a single block at any given time?
a. one
b. two
c. three
d. none of the above
3. Assume that the train in the simulation is traveling Eastbound and enters block number 10. What will the
indication of the kilometer post be when entering the same block but traveling Westbound?
a. 19
b. 20
c. 21
d. 22
4. What is the maximum allowable speed in an upcoming block with a Green/Yellow signal?
a. 80 km/hr
b. 150 km/hr
c. 230 km/hr
d. 300 km/hr
5. In the simulation which blocks have civil speed limits?
a. 0, 1 and 11
b. 0, 1, 10, 11, 12
c. 0, 1, 11, 13, 14
d. 0, 1, 11, 12, 13
6. What is the approximate braking distance from 300km/h to 100km/hr under full service braking?
a. 1.5 km
b. 2.5 km
c. 3.5 km
d. 4.5 km
7. What is the approximate braking distance from 100km/hr to a complete stop under emergency braking?
a. lkm
b. 500m
c. 200m
d. 100m
8. In the event of a motor failure how long will the failure remain active before it is reset automatically?
a. 20 secs
b. 12 secs
c. 30 secs
d. 50 secs
9. In the event of a bearing failure how long will the failure remain active before it is reset automatically?
a. 20 secs
b. 12 secs
c. 30 secs
d. 50 secs
10. Assume that you are entering a bock with Red/Yellow signal.For how long are you allowed maintain a
speed of 90 km/h while within that block?
a. Not for a single second. ATP will apply emergency brakes immediately
b. For 10 secs
c. For 15 secs
d. For 20 secs
11. Assume you are run as a test subject what will happen when the simulation is suspended?
a. The experiment will be over
b. Screens will be blanked and questions relating to the state of the train are asked
c. None of the above can happen
d. Both a and b can happen
12. Assume that while you are driving the train you are entering a block which has a Red/Yellow signal
while the incab signal shows Yellow for that block. What the maximum allowable speed at that block?
a. 80 km/h
b. 150 km/h
c. 0 km/h. Stop the train and immediately contact the CTC requesting directions
d. 50 km/h
13. Assume that you are driving the train using the automatic control mode and the next block has a civil
speed limit. What will you do?
a. Nothing. Leave the automation handle the situation.
b. Observe down the track to see whether there is an obstruction. If so you assume manual control
for regulating the speed of the train or apply emergency brakes.
c. Assume manual control immediately
d. Slow down the speed of the train and notify the CTC requesting further instructions
14. How far will the vehicle have traveled before a brake failure is automatically reset?
a. 800 meters
b. 900 metes
c. 1000 meters
d. None of the above
15. How many brake pressure tanks are available in the simulation system?
a. one
b. two
c. None. The system uses regenerative braking.
d. None of the above.
16. How far can the operator see down the track in the simulation?
a. More than half a kilometer but less that a kilometer
b. More than a kilometer but less that a 2 kilometers
c. Depends on the position of the vehicle
d. Depends on the weather conditions (fog, snow)
17. From within which mode you can slow down the train (neglect programmed stop mode)
a. Manual
b. Cruise control
c. Autopilot
d. All of the above
Appendix C
Subject Consent Form
The U. S. Department of Health and Human Services requires that all persons used
as subjects in experiments sign a consent agreement.
The procedures to be followed in our experiments involve making observations
from a computer or related displays. making decisions and communicating these by
mechanical or verbal means to be provided and explained to you in detail. These
experiments do not. in our judgment. pose any risks or hazards to your health or well-
being. You are free to ask any questions and have them answered to your satisfaction.
and are free to withdraw consent and discontinue participating at any time without
prejudice.
I understand that I may contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use of
Humans as Experimental Subjects, Dr. H. Walter Hones, E23-425. MIT (tel. 253-
1772). if I feel I have been treated unfairly as a subject, and that further information
may be obtained by calling the MIT Insurance and Legal Affairs Office. 4-104 (tel. 253-
2822).
I consent to be a subject in the MIT Human-Machine Systems Laboratory under
the above stated conditions.
(name) (signature) (date)
Appendix D
Experiment Design
Below are presented the designated positions along the track at which emergencies were set to occur.
To make the notation more compact we use the codes: m for motor failures, b for bearing failures and o for
obstructions.
Motor failure codes Distance from last station (km) Direction of travel Time block
1 13.25 Eastbound 1st
2 40.58 Eastbound 2 nd
3 30.52 Westbound 3rd
Bearing failure codes Distance from last station (km) Direction of travel Time block
1 33.28 Eastbound 1st
2 3.06 Westbound 2nd
3 26.05 Westbound 3 rd
grading crossing codes Distance from last station (km) Direction of travel
1 1.523 Eastbound
2 21.451 Eastbound
3 22.726 Eastbound
4 22.607 Westbound
5 26.549 Westbound
6 48.181 Westbound
The next appendix goes in detail to present
reaction was.
which scenario each subject went through and what its
Appendix E
Subject Emergency Scenarios
and Data
Subject 1
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic ml hit 8.205 secs
b3 miss -
o6 No collision Stop 91.22 m
Cruise m2 hit 2.28 sees
b3 hit 5.595 sees
o5 No collision Stop 80.14 m
Manual bI hit 8.22 secs
b2 hit 15 secs
m3 hit 1.981 secs
o4 No collision Stop 185.07 m
Subject 2
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic bl 1 hit 7.206 secs
b2 hit 13.194 secs
m3 hit 3
ol No collision Stop 66.37 m
Cruise b2 miss
m3 hit 3.1
03 No collision Stop 89.21 m
Manual ml hit 9.48
b3 miss
06 No collision Stop 79.6 m
Subject 3
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic b2 hit 9.86 secs
m3 hit 8.7 secs
o3 No collision Stop 140 m
Cruise ml hit 5.45 secs
b3 hit 13.1 secs
06 No collision Stop 26.45 m
Manual bl hit 12.85 secs
m2 miss
b3 hit 15.7 secs
ol No collision 196.77 m
Subject 4
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic b2 miss
m3 hit 7.38 secs
03 No collision Stop 111.5 m
Cruise ml hit 2.945 secs
m3 miss
06 No collision Stop 76.17 m
Manual bl hit 6.364 secs
m2 miss
b3 miss
Subject 5
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic bl hit 12.98 secs
m2 hit 3.54 secs
o5 No collision Stop 4.4 m
Cruise ml miss -
m3 hit 3.06 secs
o6 No collision Stop 3.71 m
Manual bl hit 3.46 secs
m2 hit 3.66 secs
b3 hit 17.6 sees
04 No collision Stop 94.78 m
Subject 6
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic b1 hit 15.59 sees
m2 miss -
b3 hit 15.74
05 No collision Stop 38.67 m
Cruise m2 hit 7.8 sees
bl miss -
o6 No collision Stop 17 m
Manual bl hit 8.154 sees
m2 hit 6.24 secs
ol No collision Stop 70.09 m
Subject 7
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic bl hit 16.06 secs
m2 hit 3.13 secs
o5 No collision Stop 27.18 m
Cruise ml hit 2.465 sees
b2 hit 17.132 sees
06 No collision 87.19 m
Manual b2 hit 16.87 secs
b3 hit 19.68 secs
ol No collision Stop 86.4 m
Subject 8
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic ml miss -
b2 hit 15.6 sees
05 No collision Stop 56.48 m
Cruise ml miss -
b2 miss -
m3 hit 3.48 secs
06 No collision 171.1 m
Manual ml hit 10.8 sees
m3 hit 7.2 sees
ol No collision Stop 68.83 m
Subject 9
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic ml hit 3.545 sees
b3 hit 17.405 secs
06 collision -
Cruise m2 hit 6.481 secs
b3 miss -
o5 No collision Stop 158 m
Manual ml miss -
b2 miss -
m3 hit 4.174 secs
ol No collision Stop 132.66 m
Subject 10
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic b2 hit 16.2 sees
m3 hit 3 sees
Cruise bl hit 7.32 secs
m2 miss -
b3 miss
05 collision -
Manual ml hit 3.125 sees
b2 hit 13.8 secs
06 No collision Stop 163.66 m
Subject 11
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic ml hit 3.125 sees
m3 miss -
05 No collision Stop 95.75 m
Cruise bl hit 8.288 secs
m2 hit 4.51 sees
b3 hit 11.04 sees
02 collision Stop 62.79 m
Manual m2 hit 3.361 sees
m3 miss -
04 No collision Stop 125.44 m
Subject 12
Control mode Emergency Response Reaction
Automatic bl hit 12.91 secs
m2 hit 4.4 secs
b3 hit 15.34 secs
04 No collision Stop 134.88 m
Cruise ml hit 2.9 sees
b2 hit 7.261 secs
m3 miss -
o05 No collision Stop at 142.92 m
Manual b2 hit 8.4 secs
03 No collision Stop 199.39 m
